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THE MARKET FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FEDERALISM, CRIME CONTROL, AND 
JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION 
BY 
DORON TEICHMAN* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last few decades the United States has been engaged in an escalating war against 
crime. Between 1982 and 2001, the resources dedicated by American taxpayers to the 
justice system have more than quadrupled.1 Discounting for inflation, this number 
continues to reflect a 165% real increase in this expenditure,2 as well as a rise in the part 
of the American Gross Domestic Product dedicated to the justice system. 3 At the same 
time, criminal sanctions in the United States have also been on the rise. The incarceration 
rate has more than tripled, from 139 per 100,000 residents in 1980 to a staggering 476 per 
                                                 
* Humphrey Fellow in Law and Economic Policy, The University of Michigan Law School. For helpful 
comments, I thank Oren Bar-Gil, Omri Ben-Shahar, Jenna Bednar, Daniel Halberstam, Alon Harel, Aaron 
Goodman, Vik Khanna, Jim Krier, Rob Mikos, Barak Orbach, Kim Thomas and participants at the 2004 
meeting of the Israeli Law and Economics Association. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support 
provided by the Olin Center for Law and Economics at the University of Michigan.  
 
1 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Justice Expenditure and Employment in the United States, 2001, 2 (2004) 
(hereinafter Justice Expenditure Report). It should be noted that these figures include all of the costs of 
upholding the court system and therefore include costs associated with civil litigation as well. Nonetheless, 
unless there has been a disproportionate rise in the expenditure dedicated to the civil elements of the justice 
system these figures should give a general indication as to the trends of the expenditures on the criminal 
aspects of the justice system. 
 
2 Id. at 1. 
 
3 Id. at 3. (noting that while in 1982 1.10% of the American GDP was dedicated to the justice system, in 
2001 this number grew to 1.66%). These figures also reflect a 271% increase in the per capita expenses on 
the justice system. Id. at 2. 
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THE MARKET FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE  2 
100,000 residents in 2002.4 This rate of increase is in sharp contrast to other Western 
countries.5 Finally, in recent years we have witnessed a constant decline in the procedural 
safeguards granted to criminal defendants by courts in the United States, which again is 
in contrast to foreign countries.6 
The systematic harshening of the American criminal justice system7 is a complex 
phenomenon lacking a single explanation. Rather, it relates to American attitudes towards 
crime, local crime rates, and the partisan politics surrounding criminal law.8 This Article 
aims to add another piece to this puzzle and points out how the decentralized structure of 
the American criminal justice system creates a dynamic process in which local 
communities have an incentive to increasingly harshen that system’s standards. This 
argument builds on the insights of two parallel lines of literature that have thus far not 
been combined in a complete fashion. 9 The first is the jurisdictional competition 
                                                 
4 Incarceration Rate Trends, Bureau of Justice Statistics, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/incrttab.htm (last visited May 14, 2004). See also  David C. 
Leven, Curing America’s Addiction to Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 641, 642-43 (pointing out the rise 
of the prison population in the United States in recent decades). 
 
5 Michael Tonry, Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates So High?, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 419, 419 (1999). 
As noted by Professor Luban in 1993 the United States had the highest incarceration rate in the world - 
higher than pre-Glasnost Soviet Union, post-Tiananmen Square China, and pre-de Klerk South Africa. See 
David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1749-50 (1997). 
 
6 Tonry  Id. at 419-20. See also  Louis Michel Seidman, Criminal Procedure as the Servant of Politics, 12 
CONST . COMM. 207, 209 (1995) (stating that “judges have virtually gone out of the business of actually 
policing the voluntariness of confessions and regularly sanction the sort of coercive tactics that would have 
led to the suppression of the evidence a half century ago”). 
 
7 A terminological comment should be made at this point regarding the term ‘criminal justice system’. For 
the purposes of this Article this term is used in order to encompass all policy tools that a government can 
use in order to regulate criminal behavior. The most obvious of these tools is the criminal code which 
defines which acts are criminal and what are the sanctions that are attached to these acts. Yet this term 
includes additional tools such as the expenditures made by the government in order to finance law 
enforcement agencies, the rules of evidence governing criminal trials, and the rules of criminal procedure. 
 
8 See generally Tonry, supra note 5. 
 
9 For an exception see Richard Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 167, 180 (1996). 
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literature. This line of literature demonstrated that under a stylised set of assumptions, 
competition among local governments might lead to efficient levels of taxation and of 
supply of public goods.10  In the past few decades this literature has covered a wide array 
of legal fields including corporate law, 11 environmental law, 12 taxation, 13 bankruptcy,14 
trusts,15 and family law.16 The common characteristic of these studies is the treatment of 
the different units creating a decentralized government as actors who compete among 
themselves to attract desirable types of activity and repel unwanted types of activity.  
The second line of literature my argument builds upon is the crime displacement 
literature.17 This literature treats the decision of profit driven criminals (e.g., car thieves, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 The initial contribution to this literature should be attributed to Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
 
11 See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 
663 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 
J. LEGAL STUD. 251; Daniel R. Fischel, The Race to the Bottom Revisited: Reflections on Recent 
Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. L. REV. 913 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 1435 (1992). 
 
12 See, e.g ., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Scott R. 
Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical 
Debate Over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting , 8 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 55 (1998). 
 
13  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes under the 
Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 458-61 (1996). 
 
14 See, e.g ., David A Skeel, Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 
TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies 
in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001). 
 
15 Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trusts Law's Race to the Bottom? , 85 CORNELL L. REV 1035 
(2000). 
 
16 See, e.g ., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize 
Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995). 
 
17 Significant early contributions to the study of crime displacement were made by  Thomas A. Reppetto, 
Crime Prevention and the Displacement Phenomenon, 22 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 166 (1976); Simon 
Hakim et al., Interjurisdictional Spillover of Crime and Police Expenditures, 55 LAND ECON. 200 (1979). 
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drug dealers) as to where to commit a crime as a rational decision in which criminals aim 
to maximize their expected payoff from crime. Thus, this literature has pointed out that 
both public measures such as additional police activity, and private measures such as 
building fences, may simply cause crime to move from one place to the other.  
Combining the insights of jurisdictional competition and crime displacement 
points out that the goal of encouraging crime migration might drive local communities to 
gradually harshen their criminal justice system. A jurisdiction raising the price of 
committing a crime within it either by raising the sanction or the probability of detection 
makes neighbouring jurisdictions more attractive crime targets. This, in turn, will cause 
these neighbouring jurisdictions to adjust their sanctions and probabilities of detection in 
order to prevent criminal activity from moving to them. Over time, these dynamics will 
cause a decentralized criminal justice system to shift towards harsher standards.  In other 
words, while some commentators have argued that we are witnessing an arms race 
between law enforcement agencies and criminals,18 what we might actually be witnessing 
is an arms race between local communities attempting to drive crime to their neighbors. 
From a doctrinal perspective, the analysis presented in the Article is closely 
related to the debate triggered by the Supreme Court’s rulings in U.S. v. Lopez19 
regarding the role of the federal government in the realm of criminal law. 20 Thus far, this 
                                                                                                                                                 
For reviews of the topic  see, e.g., CRIME SPILLOVER (Simon Hakim and George F. Rengert eds., 1981); 
CRIME DISPLACEMENT (Robert P. McNamara ed., 1994); RATIONAL CHOICE AND SITUATIONAL CRIME 
PREVENTION (Grame Newman, Ronald V. Clarkeand S. Giora Shoham eds., 1997). 
 
18 Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1523 (2000). 
 
19 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 
20 In Lopez the Supreme Court struck down the federal Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 after finding 
that it exceeded Congress’s power under the commerce clause.  
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discussion has mainly focused on issues such as the historical limits of congressional 
authority, 21 the relative advantages of the federal and state criminal justice systems,22 the 
burden imposed upon the federal judiciary, 23 the potential effects of the federalization of 
criminal law on individual rights,24 and the importance of normative diversity in criminal 
law.25 The Article adds to this debate in the sense that it uses a political economy 
perspective to point out the potential advantages and disadvantages in allowing local 
communities to control criminal justice policies. In this context, the theoretical argument 
presented in the Article leads to the conclusion that contrary to the commonly held view 
among legal scholars,26 additional federal regulation in the area of criminal justice might 
be desirable in order to limit the inefficient harshening of that system caused by 
jurisdictional competition. Furthermore, unlike scholars who argue that federal 
intervention should focus on areas in which local jurisdictions fail to deal with crime,27 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 
HASTINGS L. J. 1135 (1994). 
 
22 James S. Gorelick and Harry Littman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federalization Debate, 46 
HASTINGS L. J. 967, 973 (1995) (pointing out the efficiency of having a centralized agency which 
specializes in certain aspects of investigation); John C. Jeffries, Jr., and John Gleeson, The Federalization 
of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 1095, 1103-25 (1995) 
(pointing out some of the functional advantages of the federal prosecutorial system). 
 
23 Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principals to Define the Proper Limits for Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction , 46 HASTINGS L. J. 979, 983-96 (1994) (arguing that the creation of additional federal 
crimes is undesirable because it over burdens the federal judiciary). But see Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton, 
The Underfederalization of Crime , 6 CORNELL J. L.  &  PUB. POL’Y. 247, 251-61 (1997) (arguing that 
additional criminal litigation is not creating an excessive burden on federal courts). 
 
24 Beale, id. at 995 (arguing that a national police force might threaten individual liberty). 
 
25 Brickey, supra note 21 at 1138-39. See also  Koleman S. Strump and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Endogenous 
Policy Decentralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2002) 
(analyzing the diversity of alcohol regulation in the United States). 
 
26 Stacy & Dayton, supra  note 23 at 247-48 n1 (reviewing the literature on the issue). 
 
27 Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 1029, 1077-81 (1995). 
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the Article makes the counter intuitive argument that in the context of criminal justice, 
federal intervention might be necessary when states are successful at reducing crime. 
The Article is organized as follows: Section II will introduce the concepts of 
jurisdictional competition and crime displacement and will argue that as a positive 
matter, a decentralized criminal justice system is expected to create a competitive process 
among the different units composing it, in which each such unit attempts to divert crime 
to neighbouring communities. Section III will then turn to evaluate the normative aspects 
of jurisdictional competition in the area of criminal justice. In this context it will be 
shown that competition can have both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, the 
forces of competition might drive jurisdictions to fight crime efficiently, since any 
jurisdiction that functions inefficiently will suffer from a rise in its crime rate as a result 
of crime displacement. On the other hand, jurisdictions might face a collective action 
problem in which they are spending increasingly high resources on their criminal justice 
system simply to deflect crime to their neighbours. In such a case, everyone’s interests 
would be served if jurisdictions were able to commit themselves not to compete in the 
area of criminal justice. The second half of Section III will examine more closely the 
problem of inefficient competition in the realm of criminal justice, and will explore 
different ways to deal with these inefficiencies. Finally, Section IV offers concluding 
remarks as well as suggestions for future research. 
7
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II. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
For the most part, the United States has a decentralized criminal justice system.  
State legislatures define the majority of crimes and set out the punishments for those 
crimes.28 In addition, the enforcement of criminal laws lies, in most cases, in the hands of 
local law enforcement agencies.29 Furthermore, the officials controlling such local 
agencies are often elected directly by the communities they serve. This, in turn, promises 
the development of policies that will be attuned to the preferences of local communities.30 
Employing the tools of positive public choice theory, this Section will evaluate the 
decision-making process that units of a decentralized system of government face when 
they design their criminal justice policies. 
 
1. Jurisdictional Competition 
In order to develop a model of the behavior of the different units within a 
decentralized system of government, one must initially develop a concept of the decisions 
made by these units. In recent years positive public choice theory has led us to understand 
that we can view local units in a decentralized system as players aiming to maximize 
                                                 
28 Lopez 514 U.S. at 561n.3; Engle v.  Isaac 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (the States possess primary authority 
for defining the criminal law). 
 
29 Engle, id. Justice Expenditure Report, supra  note 1 at 2-3 (presenting data on federal state and local 
expenditures). 
 
30 This structure should be contrasted with the structure of the criminal system in other countries that is 
centralized. In Israel, for instance, the bulk of criminal offences and their punishments are defined by a 
national criminal code. In addition, the enforcement of these laws is conducted by a national police force 
that is controlled by the central government. See David Weisburd, Orit Shalev, and Menachem Amir, 
Community Policing in Israel, Resistance and Change, 25 POLICING 80, 82 (2002). 
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their own welfare.31 Thus, the interactions among these units can be categorized as 
competitive in nature and the tools of game theory can be employed in order to model the 
expected equilibrium they will lead to.  
The jurisdictional competition literature can be traced back to Charles Tiebout’s 
article on the topic,32 in which he demonstrated that under a stylised set of assumptions,33 
competition among local governments might lead to efficient levels of taxation and of 
supply of public goods.34  While the normative aspect of this model (i.e. state competition 
is efficient) can be seen as controversial, its positive aspect (i.e. competitive incentives 
drive state policies) is mostly uncontested.  Since the publication of Tiebout’s article, the 
jurisdictional competition literature has spread to a wide variety of legal fields.35 Two 
illustrative examples that reflect reverse incentives can be found in the areas of corporate 
law and welfare benefits. In the context of corporate law, states have an incentive to 
attract corporations to incorporate within their jurisdiction in order to enlarge their tax 
revenues.36 Given the high mobility of corporations associated with the relatively low 
                                                 
31 For some general examples of this line of literature see, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, Barry G. Rabe and 
Kenneth K. Wong, WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS (1986); THE NEW FEDERALISM (John Ferejohn and Barry 
R. Weingast eds., 1997); David L. Shapiro, FEDERALISM (1995). 
 
32 Tiebout, supra  note 10. 
 
33 Tiebout makes several assumptions within his model (id. at 419). First, there exist a large number of 
communities. Second, there are no costs associated with moving from one jurisdiction to the other. Thus 
individuals can choose their jurisdiction based on the taxes they will need to pay and the public goods (such 
as police, public schools, etc.) that are provided within the jurisdiction. Third, individuals hold perfect 
information as to the level of taxation and the level of public goods supplied in all jurisdictions. Fourth, all 
jurisdictions are in optimal size, which means that they have the number of member at which the bundle of 
services can be produced at the minimal average cost. Fifth, communities that are below the optimal size 
seek to attract new residents in order to reach the optimal size. Sixth, there are no spill over effects or 
externalities. 
 
34 Id. at 421-24. 
 
35 See supra  notes 11-16. 
 
36 See generally sources cited in note 11 supra . 
9
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costs of reincorporation, corporations will tend to reincorporate in states offer them a set 
of corporate governance laws maximizing their value. Thus, states wishing to enlarge 
their tax revenues are expected to attempt to offer corporations the most attractive set of 
corporate governance rules. In the context of welfare policies, on the other hand, the 
interaction among jurisdictions leads to different results.37 Welfare policies are based on 
the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. Thus, a state adopting such policies 
is expected to encourage migration of poor people from states that do not have such 
policies. Yet, states generally wish to discourage the migration of poor people because 
such movement decreases the welfare of the state’s current residents. Hence, the prospect 
of poor migration is expected to cause states to be reluctant to adopt generous welfare 
policies that they would have been willing to adopt in the absence of such migration.  
The competitive process in the context of criminal law builds upon the same 
insights as the existing jurisdiction competition literature. Crime is a negative social 
phenomenon that imposes several costs on the community within which it is committed. 
First, crime imposes direct costs to the victim.38 These costs can be born by the individual 
victims of the crime or by the community through insurance contracts in which case 
members of the community will receive an accurate monetary measurement of the cost of 
crime in their community. Second, crime affects the location decision of potential 
investors.39 Communities with low crime rates attract economic investments that raise 
                                                 
 
37 For a recent review of the literature on jurisdiction competition in the area of welfare policies see 
generally Craig Volden, Entrusting the States with Welfare Reform, in THE NEW FEDERALISM 65 (John 
Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997). 
 
38 Mark A. Cohen, Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of the Cost of Crimes to Victims, 22 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 537 (1998) (measuring the costs imposed by crime on individuals). 
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employment, generate additional tax revenues, and enhance welfare. Finally, crime rates 
affect the value of properties in the area in which they are committed. Generally, 
communities suffering from high crime rates will suffer a depreciation in their property 
values and a decrease in wealth .40 The final point might be of greater importance in the 
context of jurisdictional competition because a significant portion of the tax revenue of 
localities in the United States is tied to the va lue of local properties.41 
Given the costs of crime, local communities have an incentive to lower their 
crime rates by adopting polices that will “export” this problem to neighbouring 
communities.42 This is not to say that policies are necessarily tailored with this goal in 
mind (though as we shall see, in some cases it is), rather, jurisdictions facing increased 
crime rates might adopt policies aimed towards reducing it, not realizing that as a result, 
                                                                                                                                                 
39 See, e.g., Michael H. Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development Corporations in Inner City 
Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 753, 759 (1996-1997) (noting that high crime 
rates in inner cities deter firms from locating in those communities); Douglas R. Porter, Reforming Growth 
management in the 21 st Century: The metropolitan Imperative, 12 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 335, 339 
(2001) (pointing out the connection between lower crime rates and the shift of economic development to 
suburban and rural areas). In fact, it is quite common for both states and smaller communities to point out 
their low crime rates when they attempt to draw investors. See, e.g., 
http://www.hawaii.gov/dbedt/advantages.html (Hawaii’s Business Resource Site, last visited May 20, 
2004); http://www.stedf.org/aboutsttammany.htm (St. Tammany Economic Development Foundation Site, 
last visited May 20, 2004).  
 
40 Richard Thaler, A Note on the Value of Crime Control: Evidence from the Property Market, 5 J. URBAN 
ECON. 137 (1978); Daryl A. Hellman and Joel L. Naroff, The Impact of Crime on Urban Residential 
Property Values, 16 URBAN STUDIES 105 (1979). 
 
41 See, e.g., Nina J. Crimm, Why All is not Quiet on the “Home Front” for Charitable Organizations, 29 N. 
M. L. REV. 1 (1999) (pointing out that “the property tax has been and continues to be the single largest 
source of revenue for local governmental units”); Sharon N. Humble, Comment, The Federal 
Government’s Machiavellian Impediment of the States’ Collection of Property Taxes Through the FDIC’S 
Regulation of Failed Financial Institutions: Does the End Justify the Liens? , 25 ST . MARY’S L. J. 493, 502-
3 (1993) (noting that in Texas most local governments rely primarily on property taxes); Lee R. Epstein, 
Where Yards are Wide: Have Land Use Planning and Law Gone Astray?, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 345, 374 n100 (1999) (noting that in Maryland most local governments rely primarily on 
property taxes). 
 
42 Ronald McKinnon and Thomas Nechyba, Competition in Federal Systems, in THE NEW FEDERALISM 3, 6 
(John Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingsat eds., 1997) (noting that generally states have an incentive to export 
social problems to neighboring states).  
11
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they divert crime to neighbouring jurisdictions. The policies I will analyze in this Article 
can be categorized into two types. The first aims to raise the cost of committing crimes in 
the jurisdiction in order to make it less attractive. The second attempts to expel from the 
jurisdiction individuals who demons trated that they have a high propensity to commit 
future crimes. In the next two subsections I will evaluate these two methods to displace 
crime more closely.43  
 
2. Displacing Crime 
The first way in which jurisdictions may cause criminals to shift their activity to 
neighboring jurisdictions is by affecting their ex-ante decision as to where to commit 
their crimes. Economists view the decision criminals make to commit a certain crime as a 
rational cost benefit analysis.44 According to this line of thought, criminals evaluate the 
                                                 
 
43 In this Article I will treat crime as a purely negative social phenomenon from the perspective of local 
jurisdictions. This description seems reasonable given the harms of crime presented in the text above. In 
addition, to the extent that crimes such as property crimes are efficient in the sense that they transfer 
property to individuals that derive a higher marginal utility from it, these transfers will in most cases be 
from individuals who are represented in the political system to individuals who are not represented in the 
political system. Thus, from a public choice perspective such crimes will continue to be seen as a negative 
social phenomenon. Nonetheless, there might be certain types of criminal activity that could be viewed as 
beneficial from the perspective of jurisdictions. One reason for this might be because of the positive nature 
of some types of criminals. For example, white collar criminals might generate a substantial amount of tax 
revenues and as a result jurisdictions might want to adopt policies that will attract this type of individuals. 
A second reason might be associated with benefits created by crimes themselves. For example, lenient 
enforcement of laws regulating the sale of alcohol to underaged individuals might generate additional 
profits for local businesses and additional tax revenue of local governments. A closely related category are 
crimes that border on positive types of activities that a jurisdictions wish to encourage. For instance, 
corporate criminal activity might be at times closely related to legitimate economic activity. If a jurisdiction 
sanctions such activity too heavily it might discourage individuals fearing of mistakenly crossing the 
criminal line from doing business in that jurisdiction. Finally, some jurisdictions might differ as to the 
concept of what a “harm” is. For instance, if some units in a decentralized criminal system enact sodomy 
laws that cause members of the LGBT community to migrate to jurisdictions that did not enact such 
statutes the later jurisdictions are not suffering from a “negative externality” since they do not see this 
activity as negative. On normative diversity and criminal law see sources cited in note 25 supra .  
 
44 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach , 76 J. POL. ECON. (1968) 169, 
176-79 (1968) (presenting an analysis of the supply of crime). For a more contemporary treatment of the 
12
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 25 [2004]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art25
THE MARKET FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE  12 
potential gains and costs of a crime and commit the crime only if it has a positive 
expected value. The costs of crime to criminals include the opportunity cost of not 
engaging in legal activities, the time and effort dedicated to committing crime, and the 
expected sanction the criminal justice system generates. This expected sanction is 
composed of the probability of detection and the sanction applied to those criminals who 
are actually detected. Generally, as the expected sanction rises, the net value of 
committing a crime diminishes and criminals are deterred.  
An additional dimension of the decision potential criminals make concerns where 
to commit their crimes. Arguably, there is a diverse set of targets criminals might choose 
from that differ in the expected loot value, the cost of reaching them, the expected 
sanction associated with them, and other factors. Potential criminals are expected to 
internalize all of these factors and choose the target with the highest expected value.45 In 
other words, holding everything else equal, criminals are expected to choose to commit 
their crimes in the area with the lowest expected sanction.  
Building on this theoretical framework, economists have modeled different 
aspects of the geography of criminal activity and the precautions taken by crime 
victims.46 At the same time, criminologists have studied the effects of measures taken 
                                                                                                                                                 
issue see Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses , 10 J.  ECON. PERSPECTIVES 43 
(1996). 
 
45 Joseph Deutsch, Simon Hakim and J. Weinblatt, Interjurisdictional Criminal Mobility: A Theoretical 
Perspective, 21 URBAN STUD. 451, 451 (1984) (noting that “[a] rational criminal chooses the various 
locations in which to operate in order to maximize his expected utility”). 
 
46 Deutsch, Hakim & Weinblatt, id. (modeling the spatial decision of criminals); Joseph Deutsch, Simon 
Hakim, and J. Weinblatt, A Micro Model of the Criminal’s Location Choice, 22 J. URBAN ECON. 198 
(1987) (same); Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially Optimal 
Behavior, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1991) (evaluating the precaution decision potential crime victims 
make); Koo Hui-wen and I. P. L. Png, Private Security: Deterrent or Diversion?, 14 INT’L REV. L. &  
ECON. 87 (1994) (presenting a model of crime displacement); Scott Freeman, The Spatial Concentration of 
Crime, 40 J. URBAN ECON. 216 (1996) (presenting a model explaining the spatial concentration of crime). 
13
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both by public and private actors aimed at lowering the expected payoffs of crime by 
“hardening” potential crime targets.47 Examples of such measures include police patrols, 
fences, street lighting, and the like. These studies demonstrated that in many cases such 
measures end up displacing crime to areas where these measures are not used. Concrete 
examples of crime displacement can be found with respect to burglary, 48 robbery, 49 sales 
of illegal narcotics,50 growing of illegal narcotics,51 and prostitution. 52 
 It should be noted that although the economic and criminological studies cited 
above are consistent with a concept of a rational choice criminals make as to the location 
of their crimes, their evaluation implicitly focuses on criminals’ short term decisions. In 
other words, these studies accept criminals’ place of residence as a given and evaluate 
how their decisions are affected by specific measures made in order to lower crime 
                                                 
 
47 See generally sources cited in note 17 supra . 
 
48 Stephen L. Mehay, Burglary Spillover in Los Angeles, in CRIME SPILLOVER (Simon Hakim and George 
F. Regent eds., 1981) 67. 
 
49 Chrisban Grandjean, Bank Robberies and Physical Security in Switzerland: A Case Study of the 
Escalabon and Displacement Phenomena, 1 SECURITY J. 155 (1990). But see Anthony A. Braga et al., 
Problem Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment, 37 
CRIMINOLOGY 541,567-69 (1999). 
 
50 John E. Eck, The Threat of Crime Displacement, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT  (Robert P. McNamara ed., 
1994) 103, 111-12 (reviewing the literature on displacement and drug enforcement); Rick Curtis and 
Michele Sviridoff, The Social Organization of Street-Level Drug Markets and its Impact on the 
Displacement Effect, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT  (Robert P. McNamara ed., 1994) 155 (presenting a case 
study of the displacement of drug dealers in Brooklyn). But see Braga et al., id. 
 
51 John R. Fuller and James R. O’Malley, Enforcement and Displacement: The Case of Marijuana 
Growing, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT  (Robert P. McNamara ed., 1994) 137. 
 
52 J. Lowman, Prostitution in Vancouver: Some Notes on the Genesis of a Social Problem, 28 CANADIAN J. 
OF CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1986); Roger Mathews, Developing More Effective Strategies for Curbing 
Prostitution, 1 SECURITY J. 182 (1990); Robert P. McNamara, Crime Displacement and Male Prostitution 
in Times Square, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT (Robert P. McNamara ed., 1994) 121; Phil Hubbard, 
Community Action and the Displacement of Street Prostitution: Evidence from British Cities, 29 
GEOFORUM 269 (1998). 
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rates.53 Given the methodological difficulties of measuring crime displacement, that 
criminologists have chosen to focus on the short term effects of this phenomenon should 
come as no surprise. Nonetheless, from an analytical perspective one can expect long 
term residence decisions made by criminals to be generally consistent with a rational 
choice model as well. Accordingly, given long term expected payoffs criminals will shift 
their permanent place of residence to the area that maximizes that payoff. 
To be sure, two clarifications should be made regarding potential criminals’ 
geographic decisions. First, some crimes are clearly local in nature and have little to do 
with criminals shopping around for communities with the lowest expected sanction. For 
instance, one could not reasonably argue that an abusive husband chooses the place in 
which he commits his crimes according to the analysis presented here.54 The focus of this 
subsection, rather, is on criminal activity driven by monetary profits such as the trade in 
illegal narcotics, prostitution, and theft, and therefore should be sensitive to the potential 
costs and benefits of relocating. Second, shifting criminal activity from one place to 
another is a costly endeavor that is expected to create some rigidity in the crime market 
and prevent criminals from moving to more profitable crime zones. A criminal shifting 
activity to another area has to learn the specific law enforcement practices in that area, 
the location of the potential victims, useful escape paths, and connections to other tiers of 
the criminal world. Such costs might, in many cases, create a substantial barrier to crime 
                                                 
 
53 Some studies have taken criminals place of residence as a given explicitly and measured different aspects 
of crime with respect to this given place of residence. See, e.g., T. S. Smith Inverse Distance Variations for 
the Flow of Crime in Urban Areas, 56 SOCIAL FORCES 802 (1976) (half of the offenders committed their 
crimes within 2 miles of their homes); S. Turner, Delinquency and Distance, in DELINQUENCY: SELECTED 
STUDIES 11 (T. Sellin and M. E. Wolfgang eds., 1969) (three quarters of juvenile offenders committed 
crimes within one mile of their home). 
 
54 See, e.g., John P. Mclver, Criminal Mobility, in CRIME SPILLOVER 20, 36 (Simon Hakim and George F. 
Rengert eds., 1981) (pointing out that crimes of passion tend not to be displaced). 
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displacement.55 For example, drug dealers who are highly dependant on their clientele 
might be deterred from moving to other areas by competing dealers who control those 
areas, or by the fact that they are unfamiliar with police enforcement tactics in those 
areas.56 Thus, it is not surprising that studies finding a statistically significant 
displacement effect also find that the magnitude of this effect is relatively small.57 
The concepts of jurisdictional competition and crime displacement point out a 
potential competitive process jurisdictions might engage in when designing key elements 
of their criminal justice system such as the size of the sanctions they impose on offenders 
and the amount of resources they dedicate to detecting criminals. Traditional models of 
the political economics of criminal sanctions have focused on what can be termed an 
island economy. 58 In other words, policymakers in such an economy are not affected by 
the criminal sanctions created in neighboring communities, and can design an optimal 
sanctioning regime given the unique cost of deterring crime and the harm caused by 
crime in their specific jurisdiction. Yet once we incorporate into this analysis the insight 
that the relative size of sanctions in neighboring jurisdictions affects criminals’ location 
decisions, the existing models cannot continue to describe the actual decision 
policymakers face. Rather, the ability to displace crime by raising criminal sanctions 
creates the potential for a competition among jurisdictions wishing to become the least 
“crime friendly” jurisdiction. Over time, this process can evolve into a competitive cycle 
                                                 
 
55 See, e.g., Reppetto, supra  note 17 at 175; René Hesseling, Theft from Cars: Reduced or Displaced?, 3 
EURO. J. ON CRIMINAL POLICY & RESEARCH 79, 87-8. 
 
56 Curtis & Sviridoff, supra  note 50 at 164-67 (discussing the lack of displacement in the face of additional 
enforcement efforts in Flatbush given the specific supply conditions in that neighborhood). 
 
57 See, e.g., Mehay, supra  note 48 at 78. 
 
58 See, e.g., Becker, supra  note 44 at 180-85 (deriving the conditions for optimal crime prevention policies). 
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in which jurisdictions impose increasingly harsher sanctions and spend increasingly 
larger resources on policing in order to enlarge the probability of detection. 59  
 A concrete and useful example of the process described here can be found in the 
context of policies adopted by local governments to deal with auto theft. This example is 
useful because of the characteristics both of auto thieves and of the harm created by auto 
theft. Auto thieves can be divided into two distinct types. The first steal cars in order to 
actually use them either for simple joy rides or to get from one place to another. The 
second steal cars in order to resell them either as a vehicle or to chop-shops, which 
dismantle them into spare parts. While the first type of auto theft is local in nature and 
should not be dramatically displaced, the second type of auto theft functions much more 
like a professional industry and, over time, should shift to the geographic area in which 
the profits of crime are maximized. Two characteristics of the harms caused by auto theft 
place political pressure on local governments to prevent auto theft, even at the cost of 
crime displacement. First, auto theft is a rather common crime and therefore many 
constituents will care about it while making their voting decisions. Second, auto 
insurance premiums create an explicit price tag that allow residents to compare the ability 
of different jurisdictions to prevent this type of crime. 
                                                 
 
59 Given the argument made in the text one would expect that state sanctions will be higher than federal 
sanctions for similar crimes. The reason for this is that unlike the states the federal government is expected 
to internalize crime across states and not have a preference to drive crime across state lines. Nevertheless, it 
is quite clear that generally federal punishments are more severe than state punishments for similar crimes. 
See Beale, supra  note 23 at 998. Yet this phenomenon should not be viewed as evidence contradicting the 
argument presented here. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction the federal government tends to exercise its 
power over a very small subset of cases. See Beale, id. at 981. Thus, the federal government does not 
design its criminal sanctions in these cases as if it were the sole regulator of behavior, but rather realizes 
that the brunt of the responsibility will be carried out by the states. Because of this structure the federal 
government can afford to impose the severe sanctions it chooses to impose.  
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 During the mid 1980s auto theft was on the rise in the United States.60 This rise 
was especially felt in Michigan, which held the unfortunate title of the state with the 
highest auto theft rate in the nation. 61 The increasing inconvenience and rise in insurance 
premiums eventually led the Michigan legislature to act, and in 1986 it created the 
Michigan Auto Theft Prevention Authority (ATPA).62 The Michigan ATPA includes 
representatives of law enforcement, auto insurance purchasers, and the auto insurance 
industry. 63 Its goal is to fight auto theft in the state by funding police, prosecutorial, 
judicial, and private initiatives aimed toward the reduction of auto theft.64 The activities 
of the Michigan ATPA are funded by a $1 surcharge added to the price of auto insurance 
policies in the state.65  
The creation of the Michigan ATPA gave law enforcement agencies in Michigan 
a boost in their war against auto theft from two perspectives. First, additional resources 
were allocated to fighting auto theft, which helped raise the probability of detection and 
the ability to prosecute additional car thieves. Second, the authority allowed some law 
enforcement agents across the state to deal exclusively with auto theft. This, in turn, 
allowed these agents to specialize in the field and become more effective in auto theft 
prevention.  These advantages brought a sharp decline in the Michigan auto theft rate in 
the years following the creation of the state’s ATPA, despite a continued rise in the 
                                                 
 
60 Michael R. Rand, James P. Lynch, and David Cantor, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Criminal Victimization, 1973-95 at 4 (1997). 
 
61 Michigan Auto Theft Prevention Authority 2003 Annual Report at 4 (hereinafter Michigan 2003 Report). 
 
62 Mich law – Chapter 500. Insurance Code. Sec. 6103. 
 
63 Sec. 6103(3). 
 
64 Sec. 6107(3). 
 
65 Sec. 6107(1). 
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national level of auto theft.66 Yet at least part of the success of the Michigan ATPA can 
be explained by crime displacement. Local car thieves facing an enhanced expected 
sanction in Michigan chose to shift their activity to neighboring states “like cockroaches 
fleeing a fumigated home.”67 Neighboring states, facing a rise in their auto theft rates,68 
either adopted similar measures or felt the consequences of becoming more attractive 
crime targets.69 As one Milwaukee police detective put it, “[w]e’ve seen auto theft 
decrease in Michigan after they passed a new bill. Then we saw it decrease in Illinois 
later when they passed a bill …What we have are professional thieves moving to 
different states from Michigan to Illinois to Wisconsin.”70 The same phenomenon seems 
to have taken place in other parts of the country. 71 Thus, we can see how one state’s 
                                                 
 
66 In each one of the five years following the creation of the Michigan ATPA Michigan experienced a 
decline in auto theft while in each of these years the national amount of auto theft increased. See Michigan 
2003 Report, supra  note 61 at 11. Between the years 1986 and 2002 auto thefts in Michigan decreased by 
32% while the national thefts increased by 2%. Id. 
 
67 Vicki Contavespi, Auto Suggestions, FORBES, Dec. 19, 1994 (quoting Rene Monforton, the director of 
claim services for AAA Michigan). See also Tom Held, Auto Thefts Soar in Wisconsin, State Called Haven 
for Chop Shops, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, June 5, 1993 at 1A (pointing out that the aggressive anti theft 
programs in neighboring states drove thieves to Wisconsin); Neil D. Rosenberg, 2 Similar Plans Fight Auto 
Theft, Each Other, THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, July 12, 1993, at B1 (same); Michigan Authority Helps 
Clamp Down on Auto Thefts, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 7, 1994, at 9B (reporting that tough auto theft laws in 
Michigan and Illinois are driving auto thieves to Indiana). 
 
68 Illinois State Police, Crime in Illinois 1998 at 13 (noting that auto theft in Illinois peaked in 1990); 
Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance, Crime and Arrests in Wisconsin 1998 at 64 (showing that motor 
vehicle theft in Wisconsin rose during the late 1980s and peaked around 1991-92). 
 
69 In 1991 Illinois created the Illinois Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Council. See 20 Illinois Comp. Stat. 
4005. 
 
70 Kevin Harrington, Auto Theft Up 25% as Thieves Strike 40 Times a Day, THE MILWAUKEE J., April 16, 
1992 at A1 (quoting Milwaukee Police Detective Peter Simet).  
 
71 The market for stolen cars in the south west part of the nation is unique since a large part of it relies on 
transporting the stolen cars to Mexico. From that perspective states such as Texas, Arizona and California 
are competing over deterring away this type of unique auto thieves. Initially, Arizona under-funded this 
effort and did not fund its auto theft prevention authority with mandatory surcharges. See infra  notes 80-82. 
This, in turn, led to the displacement of auto theft activity to Arizona. See, e.g.,  Miriam Davidson, Arizona 
Auto Theft Moves Into Fast Lane , CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 24, 1995 at 3 (reporting that “car 
thieves are flocking to Arizona from neighboring California, which has cracked down on car theft); 
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initiative eventually drove other states across the country to adopt similar (costly) 
programs.  
Several additional points should be noted when viewing the dynamics 
surrounding the competition among states in the context of auto theft prevention. First, 
some legislatures seem to be especially attuned to the possibility of crime displacement 
and require their ATPA to deal mainly with the type of auto theft that can be displaced to 
other states, namely, auto theft driven by economic incentives. For instance, out of the six 
potential activities for the states’ ATPA enumerated by the Michigan legislature, the top 
four deal exclusively with “economic automobile theft.”72 Second, while it is difficult to 
point out increases in the legislated sanction for auto theft, one can point out a rise in the 
effective sanction auto thieves faced.73 In the past, the prosecution of auto thieves was of 
relatively low priority. 74 Thus, these thieves faced a low, if not nonexistent, effective 
                                                                                                                                                 
Howard Fischer, State at Top of Stolen Car List, Crackdowns Pushing Thieves to Arizona , THE ARIZONA 
DAILY STAR, June 13, 1995 at 1A (noting that crackdowns in California and in Texas have left Arizona as 
the only viable border state left for auto thieves); Arizona Soars to 4 th in Auto Thefts, THE ARIZONA DAILY 
STAR, Feb. 9, 1995 at 3B (same). Eventually, these trends forced the Arizona legislature to provide for 
larger funding for the state’s ATPA. See infra note 82. See also Deborah Sharp, Crackdown is Making a 
Dent in Car Thefts, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 1997 at 4A (reporting that the crackdown on auto theft in large 
metro areas “created a boomlet of stolen cars in states such as Utah); Guillermo Contreras, Duke City Auto 
Thefts Set Record , ALBUQUERQUE J., June 27, 1998 at A1 (El Paso police recognizing that its aggressive 
attack on auto thieves squeezed some of them elsewhere). 
 
72 Sec. 6107(3)(b). See also  Vernon’s Ann Texas Civ. St. Art. 4413(37) Sec. 8 (focusing on economic auto 
theft); California (same). But see Illinois (no distinction between economic auto theft and other types of 
auto theft); Arizona, A.R.S. §41-3451 (same); Pennsylvania (same). 
 
73 The term effective sanction refers to the actual sanction auto thieves face. It should be noted that the 
problem of crime displacement did at least create public debate regarding the desired level of sanctioning 
for auto thieves. See, e.g., Contreras, supra  note 71 (quoting deputy district Attorney Richard Bowman 
stating that the penalties for swiping vehicles are not strict enough); Sheba R. Wheeler, Colorado Auto 
Theft Leaps 24%, DENVER POST , Nov. 15 2002 (noting that “authorities say they can’t combat the crime 
without tougher penalties”); Wayne Thompson, Every 30 Minutes, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 12, 1994 
at G1 (pointing out the low sanction for auto theft in Oregon as one of the causes of high theft rates); 
Rosenberg, supra  note 67 (reporting on a suggested bill to increase the penalties on auto theft in 
Wisconsin). 
 
74 See, e. g., Maryland Vehicle Theft Prevention Council 2002 Annual Report at 9 (hereinafter Maryland 
2002 Report) (“[i]n the past, the prosecution of vehicle theft  cases had relatively low priority”). 
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sanction. In order to change this situation and deter auto thieves, ATPAs began funding 
prosecutors dedicated exclusively to the prosecution of auto thieves.75 The activity of 
these prosecutors increased the number of auto thieves actually charged and convicted.76 
Other ATPAs attempted to deal with this issue by assisting the judicial branch. In Tarrant 
County, Texas, local authorities created a specialized impact court to deal exclusively 
with auto theft cases.77 The creation of this court ensured that auto thieves would actually 
be punished and thus assisted in deterring auto theft.78 Over time, the impact court was so 
effective in deterring auto theft that its services were no longer needed.79 Finally, one can 
see the competitive nature of the decision states make as to the funding of their ATPAs. 
In Arizona, the ATPA was initially funded on a voluntary basis, without the mandatory 
surcharges like in nearby California and Texas.80 This, in turn, put Arizona at a 
competitive disadvantage in its effort to deter auto theft.81 Yet by 1997, the movement of 
                                                 
 
75 See, e.g., Maryland 2002 Report, id; Arizona Automobile Theft Authority 2003 Annual Report at 17 
(hereinafter Arizona 2003 Report). 
 
76 See, e.g., Arizona 2003 Report, id. at 18 (pointing out that due to the activity of specialized prosecutors 
in 2003 the amount of auto theft cases filed rose from 304 to 558 and the number of convictions rose from 
221 to 319). 
 
77 See Generally John Council, Tarrant Judges Hijack Prized Auto Theft Impact Court, 12 TEXAS LAWYER 
July 22, 1996. See also Wheeler, supra note 73. (noting that auto theft charges have been filed in the 
municipal court where they expect harsher sanctions). 
 
78 Renee C. Lee, Officers Honored for Curbing Tarrant County Auto Thefts, THE FORT WORTH STAR 
TELEGRAM, Aug 18, 1994 at 21 (noting that shifting auto theft prosecution to the Tarrant County impact 
court raised the sanctions auto thieves faced); Council, id. (quoting the commander of the local auto theft 
task force stating that the sanctions created by the impact court were a big factor in the reduction of auto 
theft in the area); Jack Douglas Jr., Commissioners Seek Grant to Keep Auto Theft Court , THE FORT 
WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, May 29, 1996 at 8 (noting that local police and district attorney attribute the 
decline in auto theft in the area to the activity of the impact court). 
 
79 Council, id. 
 
80 Cal. Ann. Ins. Code §1872.8 (a) (imposing a $1 annual fee); Texas Stat. Ann. § 4413(37) Sec. 10 (same). 
 
81 Davidson, supra note 71 (noting the lack of funding for the local ATPA as one of the reasons for the 
rising auto theft rate) 
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car thieves to Arizona drove the state’s legislature to adopt a surcharge scheme.82 On the 
other hand, in Maryland, a cut in the funding of the local ATPA brought about a 
significant increase in the auto theft rate.83 This, in turn, led to public pressure to raise the 
amount of resources dedicated to the state’s ATPA. 84 
A second example of deterring crime away can be found in the context of three-
strike laws. In general, under these laws offenders convicted for the third time of certain 
crimes are subject to harsh mandatory sanctions.85 Adoption of these laws created of a 
large discrepancy in sanctions between different states. An offender who already has two 
strikes faces the high third strike sanction in a state that adopted such a law, while he 
faces a relatively minor sanction if he commits the same crime in a state that does not 
have a three-strike regime. Thus, some criminals are expected to find it beneficial to 
relocate their activity from states that adopted three-strike laws to those that did not.  
Anecdotal evidence supports the displacement hypothesis with respect to three-
strike laws.86 For example, a study conducted by the California Department of Justice 
                                                 
 
82 AZ Revised Statutes 41-3451 Section J (creating a mandatory surcharge of 50 cents).  
 
83 See Maryland 2002 Report, supra  note 74 at 1. 
 
84 See, e.g., Editorial, Fully Restore Theft Program Budget Cut: State Shouldn’t Retreat From Its Cross-
Jurisdictional Effort to Reduce Auto Theft , THE BALTIMORE SUN, June 21, 2001 at 16A; Del Quentin 
Wilber, Grant Cuts Concern Police, Auto Theft Programs Affected by State’s Reduced Funding , THE 
BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 9, 2001 at 1B; Jo Becker, Auto Theft Fund Cut Decried in Maryland; Executives 
Petition to Keep Programs, WASH. POST , June 12, 2001 at B1. 
 
85 For a comparative description of these laws see John Clark, James Austin, and D. Alan Henry, “Three-
strikes and You’re Out”: A Review of State Legislation, U.S. Dept. of Justice, national Institute of Justice, 
6-12 (1997). 
 
86 See, e.g., Janiskee & Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An Analysis of the Case Against 
California's Three-strikes Law, 39 DUQUESNE L.  REV. 43, 45-46 (2000) (“Prosecutors in Los Angeles 
routinely report that ‘felons tell them they are moving out of the state because they fear getting a second or 
third strike for a nonviolent offense’ ” (quoting Sanchez, A Movement Builds Against “Three-strikes” Law, 
WASHINGTON POST , Feb. 18, 2000, at A3)); John Painter, Prosecutors Antsy Over ‘Three-strikes’, 
PORTLAND OREGONIAN Sept. 16, 1994 at B2 (noting that offenders facing their third strike might be 
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found that the state’s three-strike law had the “unintended but positive consequence” of 
causing parolees to leave the state.87 Furthermore, several public figures have explicitly 
indicated that they support three-strike laws because of their displacement effect.88 For 
instance, David LaCourse, one of the initiators of Washington’s three-strike law, pointed 
out as one of the advantages of the law that, “[s]everal criminals from other states have 
said they decided not to move [to Washington] after being told of the law.”89 Hence, it 
would seem that at least one of the reasons that three-strike laws were adopted by many 
states as quickly as they were is that states were compelled to adopt this type of 
legislation in order to prevent offender migration. 90 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
leaving the state); Terry McCarthy, L.A. Gangs are Back , TIME MAGAZINE, Sept. 3, 2001 at 46 (noting that 
“[t]o avoid the mandatory 25 years to life sentence under California’s three-strikes-and-you’re-out law, 
gang members with two convictions have been moving out of state”); David LaCourse, Editorial, 
Viewpoint: ‘3 Strikes, You’re Out’ Law Proving to be Efficient Crime Fighter, THE NEWS TRIBUNE 
TACOMA, WA, Apr. 3, 1997 at A9 (head of the Seattle Police sex offender detail reporting that as a result of 
the state’s three-strike law seventeen two strike offenders fled from Seattle to other states). 
 
87 Cal. Dept. of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, “Three-strikes and You’re Out”: It’s Implications 
on the California Criminal Justice System After Four Years, 10 (1998).  
 
88 See, e.g., David Bloom, Wilson Cites ‘3 Strikes’ Results Law has Cost State Millions but has Lowered 
Crime Rate, L.A. DAILY NEWS, March 7, 1996 (California Governor, Pete Wilson, indicating that one of 
the reasons he supported the state’s three-strike law was the fact that it caused a decline in the number of 
parolees from other states moving to California). 
 
89 LaCourse, supra  note 86. 
 
90 Between 1993 and 1995 24 states enacted some type of three-strike legislation. Clark, Austin & Henry, 
supra  note 85 at 1. To be sure, there might be other reasons for the quick adoption of three-strike laws by 
the different states. For example, these laws might be a useful tool to incapacitate and deter dangerous 
individuals and therefore once states learned of this useful tool they rushed to adopt it. See J. R. Ramires 
and W.. D. Crano, Deterrence and Incapacitation: An Interrupted Time-series Analysis of California's 
Three-Strikes Law, 33 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH.  110 (2003) (measuring the potential deterrence and 
incapacitation value of the California three-strike law). But see Stolzenberg L, Dalessio SJ, “Three-strikes 
and You're Out'': The Impact of California's New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious Crime Rates, 43 
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 457 (1997) (measuring a limited deterrence effect of California’s three-strike law). 
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3. Displacing Criminals  
Thus far, the analysis has focused on creating ex-ante incentives for potential 
criminals to conduct their activity in neighboring areas. A second means for jurisdictions 
to lower their crime rates is by physically removing individuals who have a higher 
propensity to commit future crimes. More specifically, to the extent that a community 
believes that past criminal activity can serve as a reliable proxy for future criminal 
activity, the community might wish to expel individuals with criminal records.91 
Expulsion can be achieved either by outright forbidding certain individuals from living 
within a defined geographical area, or by creating a hostile environment that will 
eventually drive these individuals away. In this context, just as was the case with respect 
to criminal sanctions, we can expect to see a dynamic process in which jurisdictions 
adopt increasingly harsh policies aimed towards driving these individuals away in order 
to keep up with policies adopted by other jurisdictions. Viewed from this perspective, 
such laws and policies are another example of what has become to be known as “Not In 
My Back Yard” (NIMBY) legislation, which aims to remove unwanted activities to other 
jurisdictions.92 
An example of a policy that aims towards removing criminals from jurisdictions 
is banishment. Historically, banishment has been used by jurisdictions in order to remove 
                                                 
 
91 There exists an abundance of studies pointing out that individuals that committed certain types of 
offences are more likely to engage in future criminal activity. See Patrick A. Langan and David J. Levin, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 (2002) (measuring 
high recidivism rates among released offenders); Allen J. Beck and Bernard E. Shipley, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Special Report, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983 (1989) (same). 
 
92 See generally, Barry G. Rabe, BEYOND NIMBY:  HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING IN CANADA AND THE 
UNITED STATES (1994).   
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unwanted individuals such as sex offenders.93 For instance, in ancient India under the 
Laws of Manu the crime of rape was punished by banishment,94 and the Hammurabi 
Code provided this punishment to those convicted of incest.95 Aristotle noted that “the 
incurably bad should be banished.”96 During the eighteenth century, the British employed 
this sanction on a large scale basis by banishing criminals to America and Australia.97 
The British eventually abandoned this form of punishment only when the communities to 
which the criminals were transported had the political power to avoid this type of 
negative externality imposed upon them.98 
While one might think of banishment as a thing of the distant past with little 
relation to modern crime prevention, in reality, banishment is very much a part of the 
criminal justice system in the United States. One way in which courts currently impose 
banishment on felons is by adding it as a probation condition. For instance, Georgia 
courts use a punishment known as “158 county banishment” under which offenders are 
                                                 
 
93 See Jason S. Alloy, Note, “158-County Banishment” in Georgia: Constitutional Implications Under the 
State Constitution and the Federal Right to Travel, 36 GA. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2002) (reviewing the 
history of banishment and noting that it was reserved for “persistent troublemakers”). This is not to say that 
the sole goal of banishment is prevention. Clearly, uprooting an individual from his community reflects a 
painful punishment that creates a deterrent effect. See James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have 
Needed a System of Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 29, 47 (1996) (pointing out the effects of banishment 
on individuals in ancient times). 
 
94 Israel Drapkin, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 131 (1989). 
 
95 Lindgren, supra  note 93 at 48. 
 
96 THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 271 (W.D. Ross trans., 1986). 
 
97 The British referred to the punishment as Transportation. See generally A. Roger Ekirch, BOUND FOR 
AMERICA. THE TRANSPORTATION OF BRITISH CONVICTS TO THE COLONIES 1718-1775, 2-3 (1987) (noting 
that the main goal of transportation was to rid Britain from dangerous offenders). 
 
98 See, e.g., Benjamin Balak & Jonathan M. Lave, The Dismal Science of Punishment: The Legal-Economy 
of Convict Transportation to the American Colonies, 18 J. L. & POL. 879, 911-12 (2002) (describing the fall 
of banishment to America following the Declaration of Independence in 1776). Interestingly even during 
the 19th century several European countries (mainly Germany) continued to transport their dangerous 
criminals to the United States in subvert ways. See Richard J. Evans, Germany’s Convict Exports, 47 (11) 
HISTORY TODAY (1997). 
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banished from 158 out of the state’s 159 counties, giving them an option either to move 
to a remote county or to leave the state.99 According to one Georgia prosecutor, he was 
personally involved with over two hundred cases in which defendants were banished to 
Echols County. 100 Though banishment might not be the punishment of choice in most 
criminal cases in the United States, an abundance of cases demonstrate that courts in 
other jurisdictions use it as well.101  
Banishment is also making its way into legislation enacted by jurisdictions. The 
city of Cicero Illinois, for example, recently enacted a gang free zones ordinance 
according to which individuals who engage in gang related activities can be banished 
from the city. 102 The Cicero Ordinance also sets out a procedure for the application of the 
sanction, which is less stringent than typical criminal procedure, as it allows the 
admission of hearsay testimony, and requires proof only by the preponderance of the 
                                                 
 
99 See Alloy, supra  note 93 at 1083-85. The reason courts banish these individuals from only 158 counties 
is that the Georgia Constitution forbids the use of banishment from the state as a form of punishment. See 
GA . CONST . art. I, § 1 ¶ 21 (stating that “neither banishment beyond the limits of the state nor whipping 
shall be allowed as a punishment for a crime”). 
 
100 Id. 
 
101 See Wm Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its Abolition Under the 
First Amendment, 24 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 465-75 (1998) (reviewing 
banishment litigation in the different states). It should be noted that in many cases banishment is imposed 
with the consent of the defendant through the use of a plea agreements. Such cases will for the most part 
not manifest themselves in case law. See Alloy, id. at 1103. 
 
102 Stephanie Smith, Civil Banishment of Gang Members: Circumventing Criminal Due Process 
Requirements, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1465-66 (2000). It should be noted that the Cicero gang ordinance 
was passed as a civil rather than a criminal remedy. Since the goal of this legislation is to deal with criminal 
activity I view it as part of the criminal justice system as I define it in note 7 supra . Similar policies were 
adopted in California in which localities used public nuisance injunctions in order to force gang members 
out of certain areas. See Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public 
Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409 (1999). The use of 
these injunctions led over time to the displacement of gang activity from one area to the other. Werdegar, 
id. at 439-42 (reviewing an ACLU study measuring the displacement effects of the injunctions). 
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evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.103 Reportedly, soon after the 
Ordinance’s enactment, gang members in Cicero began to migrate out of the city. 104 In 
addition, the enactment caught the attention of neighboring communities that considered 
adopting such measures themselves.105  
A closely related topic demonstrating communities’ desire to explicitly expel 
unwanted individuals can be seen with respect to the transfer of prison inmates between 
states. In recent years a market for inmates has developed in the United States. States 
with an insufficient amount of prison beds buy additional incarceration capacity by 
shipping their criminals to states that have a surplus of prison beds. The transfer of prison 
inmates creates two main problems for the communities receiving them from the 
perspective analyzed in this Article. First, when inmates succeed to escape from prison 
they create a risk to residents in the immediate vicinity. Second, inmates might decide 
upon their release to stay in the state of their incarceration.  Not surprisingly, importing 
prison inmates often raises fierce public debates in the communities to where the inmates 
are imported.106 One can even see specific legislation proposals that are aimed towards 
protecting the interests of communities tha t agree to host prison inmates. For instance, in 
Louisiana, a local legislature proposed to mandate that any out of state inmate hosted by 
                                                 
 
103 Smith, Id. 
 
104 Id. at 1467. 
 
105 Id. 
106 See, e.g., Phil Manzano, Prison Means Ticket Out of Oregon for Many, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 
20, 1996 at B1 (reporting of outrage in Texas following the escape of an inmate from Oregon); Noah 
Bierman, Private Prisons might Import Inmates, PALM BEACH POST , Apr. 14, 2000 at 1A. 
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Louisiana be removed from the state prior to his release.107 As he put it, “[i]f their first 
day of freedom is walking around the streets of Louisiana, then they might want to stay 
here, and I don’t think we want to recruit prisoners.”108 
A second and more nuanced way jurisdictions can remove unwanted individuals 
is by creating a hostile environment that will cause these individuals to leave voluntarily. 
This goal can be achieved by imposing restrictions on the lives of convicted offenders in 
areas such as housing, employment, and welfare benefits. Over time, lowering the 
expected quality of life of offenders will cause them to move to jurisdictions that do not 
have such restrictions. This, in turn, could lead to a competitive process in which other 
jurisdictions adopt such restrictions simply to prevent offender migration.  In fact, one 
can observe a general trend among states to impose a wide array of restrictions on 
convicted offenders that encompass the most meaningful aspects of their lives.109  For 
instance, states routinely use their authority to require occupational licenses to limit the 
employment ability of convicted offenders.110 This general picture is consistent with the 
                                                 
107 Capital Bureau, Law Could Ensure Convicts Return Trip: Politician Fears they would remain in La., 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug 14, 2001 at 02. See also Jacqueline Charles, Florida Lawmakers Aim to Bar Prison 
Operators from Importing Inmates, KRTBN KNIGHT-RIDER TRIBUNE BUSINESS NEWS, Apr. 13, 2000 
(reporting on an initiative that would prevent any out of state inmates from being imported into Florida). 
 
108 Id. 
 
109 See, e.g., Bruce E. May, Real World Reflection: The Character Component of Occupational Licensing 
Law; A Continuing Barrier to Ex-Felon’s Employment Opportunities, 71 N. D. L.  REV. 187 (1995) 
(reviewing employment limitations); Nora V. Demleitner, “Collateral Damage”: No Re-Entry for Drug 
Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1033-47 (reviewing collateral consequences of convictions in different 
states); Avi Brisman, Double Whammy: Collateral Consequences of Conviction and Imprisonment for 
Sustainable Communities and the Environment , 28 WM & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 423, 432-448 
(2004) (same). 
 
110 See May, id. at 193-206; Bris man, id. at 432-35. While some limitations, such as limiting the ability of 
convicted felons to work in accounting, pharmacy, and private investigation, can be seen as rational 
preventative measures, barring offenders from practices such as billiard room operator, junk dealer, and 
engineering seems to have little to do with the prevention of future crimes. Brisman, id. at 433 (listing 
limitations on employment of convicted offenders). 
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hypothesis that states are attempting to displace individuals that have demonstrated a high 
propensity to commit future crimes.111 
A concrete example of policies that can be used in order to encourage offender 
migration can be found in the context of Sex Offender Registration and Notifications 
Laws (SORNLs), commonly known as Megan’s Laws. SORNLs were initially enacted to 
help deal with the recidivism of sex offenders by creating sex offender registries and by 
notifying the public about released sex offenders who reside within a given 
community. 112 The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act,113 which describes the minimal required registration and 
notification provisions that each state must enact in order not to lose federal law 
enforcement grants, sets forth the federal framework for SORNLs.114 Currently, all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia have enacted some form of such a law. 115 
SORNLs create a series of adverse effects on the lives of released sex offenders. 
First, some of these laws include legal limitations on the lives of offenders in areas such 
as housing and labor opportunities.116 In addition, the notification aspects of SORNLs 
                                                 
 
111 To be sure, many of the collateral consequences of criminal convictions were initiated by the federal 
government, and in that sense do not reflect policies aimed at displacement. Nonetheless, states continue to 
participate in this process and use their authority in those areas in which the federal government is not 
active. 
 
112 According to a recent study of the Bureau of Justice Statistics sex offenders have a substantially higher 
chance to be re-arrested for a new violent sex offense. See Lawrence A. Greenfeld, Sixty Percent of 
Convicted Sex Offenders Are on Parole or Probation, Bureau of Justice Statistics News Release, Feb. 2, 
1997, available at 1997 WL 53093 (D.O.J.). 
 
113 42 U.S.C. § 14071 [hereinafter: the Jacob Wetterling Act]. 
 
114 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g). 
 
115 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (U.S. 2003). 
 
116 See OKLA. ST . ANN. § 589 (prohibiting offenders from working in business that provide service to 
children and schools); ALA CODE § 15-20-26(a) (prohibiting offenders from working within 2,000 feet of a 
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subject sex offenders to a wide array of nonlegal sanctions ranging from embarrassment 
to extreme acts of violence.117 States can control, to some degree, the level of these 
sanctions by the type of public notification they adopt. For instance, states that choose to 
conduct public notification by using a state website might be able to enhance the adverse 
effects of notification. Viewed from this perspective, SORNLs can be used by states to 
create an adverse environment for sex offenders that will drive at least some of them out 
of the state (or will prevent offenders residing in neighboring states from choosing to 
migrate into the state).  
Anecdotal evidence regarding the enactment and application of SORNLs suggests 
the validity of the analysis presented here. First, one can see a process in which sex 
offenders tend to migrate to those states with more lenient laws. Some law enforcement 
officials have been reporting that sex offenders engage in “jurisdiction shopping”, 
looking for states that have less strict registration and notification requirements. For 
example, the official responsible for Oregon’s registration program in 1997 reported that 
“[w]e … get calls and letters from sex offenders in other states wanting to know about 
sex offender registration in Oregon … The express purpose is they’re looking for a state 
where they don’t have to register.”118 Similar anecdotal information gathered from 
                                                                                                                                                 
school or a child care facility), MINN. STAT . ANN. § 244.052 (subd 4a) (b) (prohibiting property owners 
from knowingly renting a room to level three sex offenders if that owner has an agreement with an agency 
that provides shelter to victims of domestic abuse); OKLA. ST . ANN. § 590 (prohibiting offenders from 
residing within a two thousand foot radius of any school or educational institution); ALA CODE § 15-20-26 
(establishing a list of limitations on the places in which sex offenders may reside). It should be noted that in 
some cases housing limitations can be used as de-facto banishment punishments. See Doe v. Miller, 298 
F.Supp.2d 844,  851-52 (2004) (analyzing the effects of the Iowa housing limitation). 
 
117 For a review of these sanctions see Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic 
Perspective on Megan’s Laws (2004). 
 
118 Jennifer Bjorhus, ‘Megan’s Law’ May Have Loopholes, PORTLAND OREGONIAN Dec. 7, 1997 at B01. 
See also  Brian Coddington, Plan Brands Sex Offenders Legislation Seeks to Name Names, Confine Worst 
Offenders Indefinitely, THE SPOKESMAN REV., Dec. 12, 1997 at B1 (reporting that it is common “for 
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offenders indicates that they do in fact choose to move to jurisdictions that offer them a 
more lenient registration regime. For instance, a convicted sex offender from Michigan 
reportedly moved to New Mexico because its registration laws were less harsh than those 
of other states at the time.119 
 Second, comments made by lawmakers during the debates regarding the 
enactment of SORNLs show that a desire to deter sex offenders from choosing to reside 
within their jurisdictions motivated at least some of the legislatures enacting these laws. 
For example, a New York Assemblyman stated during a discussion on the New York 
SORNL that “the result of this  [legislation] … is the fact that a sex offender who is going 
to come out after serving his time might rethink as to where he is going to relocate, and I 
think that one of the results of this legislation might be that this guy is going to go out of 
town, out of state, and that’s very good for us.”120 Similarly, in Tennessee the Senate 
sponsor of the local SORNL, Senator Crow, stated that “we’ll see sex offenders leaving 
                                                                                                                                                 
inmates confined in other states to call Idaho asking about sex offender registration requirements”); Ed 
Vogel, State Trying to Locate, Evaluate Sex Offenders in County, THE LAS VEGAS REV. – J., Nov. 4, 1997 
at 4b (reporting that an administrator of the Nevada Criminal History Records Repository received 
numerous calls inquiring about the state’s enforcement of its SORNL and that he suspected that these calls 
were made by offenders who were shopping for a state with lenient notification policies). 
 
119 Bob Schwartz, From Mottos to Molesters, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 2, 2002 at E1 (reporting on the case 
of David Siebers). See also  Bjorhus, id. (reporting on the case of Ralph D. Webb, an offender who 
committed his offenses as a juvenile and chose to move to Alaska in order to avoid registration since 
Alaska did not require juvenile offenders to register); Jenny A. Montana, An Inefficient Weapon in the 
Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey’s Megan’s Law, 3 J. L. & POL’Y 569, 582 note 56 (1995) 
(reporting on the case of Joseph Gallardo, an offender who moved from Washington to New Mexico, a 
state that did not engage in public notification at the time); Elizabeth Kelley Cierzniak, There Goes the 
Neighborhood: Notifying the Public When a Convicted Child Molester is Released into the Community, 28 
IND. L. REV. 715, 720 (1995) (reporting on the case of an offender who chose to move from Arkansas to 
Kentucky because the later did not have a registration requirement at the time). 
 
120 Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 621-22 (1996) (quoting N.Y. Assembly Minutes, at 388-89). Yet 
another New York legislature commented that sex offenders are the “human equivalent of toxic waste”. See 
Pataki, id. at  622  (quoting New York Assembly Minutes, at 417). This comment makes the connection 
between SORNLs and environmental NIMBY regulation self evident.  
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Tennessee and you won’t see them coming in.”121 In Idaho, the Attorney General who 
promoted the adoption of the local SORNL said, “what these individuals [sex offenders] 
were doing was shopping around to see what states did not have sex offender 
registration.”122  
Third, the actual content of the different SORNLs also validates the jurisdictional 
competition hypothesis. As a general matter, the hypothesis predicts that over time, states 
will increasingly harshen their SORNLs. Indeed, a survey of pending and new legislation 
in 12 states, in 1998, indicated that states mostly adjust their SORNLs to make them 
stricter.123 States have adopted harsher penalties for failing to register, have enlarged the 
scope of notification, and have decided to apply their legislation in a retroactive 
manner.124 Minnesota provides a concrete example. Since 1995, the Minnesota legislature 
has been debating the issue of community notification. 125 Generally, the debate has been 
much more vibrant then that of other legislatures and a number of the proposals made 
have even been rejected.126 Nevertheless, by 2001, the Minnesota legislature realized that 
                                                 
 
121 See brief filed on behalf of petitioner in Cutshall v. Tennessee, 120 S.Ct 1554 (2000). 
 
122 Coddington, supra note 118.  See also , Cierzniak supra  note 119 at 720 (noting that the co-chairman of 
the Kentucky Attorney General's Task Force on Child Sexual Abuse was quoted saying, “There's a lot of 
things we want our state known for. A safe haven for sex offenders isn't one of them”); Joe Darby, Sex 
Offenders Must Tell Neighbors: Texas Man Ordered to Comply or Leave LA, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Feb. 6, 1996 at B1 (quoting a Louisiana prosecutor stating that had out of state offenders not 
been forced to register in Louisiana “it could have made Louisiana a haven for convicted sex criminals 
from other states”).  
 
123 See THE NAT’L CRIM. JUST . ASS’N, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION: PROBLEM 
AVOIDANCE & BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION, & SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION & NOTIFICATION COSTS 
SURVEY RESULTS 67-9 (1999). 
 
124 Id. 
 
125 For a review of the legislative process in Minnesota with respect to notification legislation see Wayne A. 
Logan, Jacob’s Legacy: Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Laws, Practice, and 
Procedure in Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 1296-1315 (2003). 
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since the maximum period of registration required under its SORNL was ten years, 
offenders required to register for life in other jurisdictions were moving to Minnesota.127 
To deal with this, the Minnesota legislature amended its SORNL and required certain 
types of offenders to register for life.128 In addition, one can see the concern of 
legislatures over the movement of sex offenders in the registration requirements of some 
states. In most states, registration is triggered by a conviction – in a state court or a court 
of another state – of one of the offenses enumerated in its SORNL. 129 Yet some states 
have begun requiring offenders moving from other states to register as sex offenders, 
even if they do not fall within the registration requirements of that state, if the offender 
was required to register under the SORNL of the state from whence he came.130 
Requiring individuals to register, for the sole reason that they moved from a different 
state, demonstrates that states tailor their SORNLs to deal with offender migration.  
Finally, one can see that local law enforcement officials are using community 
notification in order to remove sex offenders from their communities. For example, it has 
been reported that in Monrovia, California, the local police department attempted to drive 
a sex offender out of town by distributing flyers with information about the offender.131 
                                                                                                                                                 
126 Id. 
 
127 Id. at 1316.  
 
128 MINN. STAT. §243.166 subd 1(b)(3) (2001) and subd 6(d) (2001). In addition, this legislation was likely 
driven by the minimal requirements set by the Jacob Wetterling Act with respect to the duration of 
registration. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (b)(6)(B) (requiring life time registration for certain types of offenders). 
 
129 See, e.g . ALASKA STAT . §12.63.100(5) (defining sex offender); ARIZ. REV. STAT . §13-3821A (defining 
the people required to register under the act); Miss. Code §45-33-25 (defining registration requirements); 
N.J. Stat. §2C:7-2 (defining registration requirements); 57 Okla. Stat. §582 (defining the applicability of the 
act). 
 
130 ME. STAT . §11223; MICH. COMP . LAWS ANN. §28.723(1)(d). 
 
33
Teichman:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
THE MARKET FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE  33 
The flyers sparked public demonstrations that only managed to force the offender to 
relocate within the town. Then, the police department moved to a more proactive method, 
and raised money from a private donor and purchased for the offender a one-way plane 
ticket out of town. This case is not an isolated incident.132 
  
III. REGULATING THE MARKET FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
 
In the previous Section, I explained the existence of a competitive market for 
criminal justice which is driven by attempts to displace crime to neighboring 
communities. This descriptive insight raises the normative question of how the criminal 
justice system should be structured. In this Section, I will point out the potential benefits 
and problems associated with a competitive decentralized criminal justice system. That 
done, I will turn to focus on the problems that might be created by such a system and 
suggest several policy tools to remedy them. 
 
1. A Race to the Bottom or a Race to the Top? 
The debate over the efficiency of jurisdictional competition is a long standing one 
in the federalism literature.133 On one side of the debate are those who argue that 
                                                                                                                                                 
131 See Michael Dear and Django Sibley, The One-Way Strategy for Sex Offenders makes Nobody Safe, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000 at M6. 
 
132 See Bob Schwartz, From Mottos to Molesters, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 2, 2002 at E1 (reporting that the 
police in Toledo, Ohio, furnished a sex offender with a bus ticket out of town). It would seem that local 
judges are also willing to take steps to remove sex offenders from their communities. See Richard Cockle, 
Offender May Return to Oregon Hometown , PORTLAND OREGONIAN C02, Jan. 14 2000 (reporting that a 
Judge in Nebraska ordered a sex offender to leave the state). 
 
133 For a review of this debate see, e.g. William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics 
of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second Best World, 86 GEO. L. J. 201 (1997).  
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competition among jurisdictions, much like other forms of competition, drives them to an 
efficient outcome.134 These commentators view jurisdictions as producers of a product, 
namely, public goods such as law, and potential residents (be they real persons or 
corporations) as consumers of the product.135 The need to attract satisfied tax paying 
residents drives jurisdictions to meet the preferences of their consumers in an optimal 
fashion. 136 In addition, proponents of jurisdictional competition point out that such 
competition may lead to more innovation with respect to public policies.137 According to 
this line of thought, local jurisdictions can function as “experimental laboratories” for the 
development of beneficial social policies.138 Thus, these commentators conclude that 
jurisdictions engage in a “race to the top” that benefits society as a whole. The following 
conclusion is that just as other well functioning competitive markets should not be 
regulated, neither should the jurisdictional one. 
                                                 
 
134 See, e.g., Tiebout, supra note 10. The Tiebout model was later refined in Truman F. Bewley, A Critique 
of Tiebout’s Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 ECONOMETRICA 713 (1981) and in Pierre Pestieau, 
The Optimality Limits of the Tiebout Model, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 173 
(Wallace E. Oates ed., 1977). For a more contemporary treatment of this line of thought see Revesz, supra 
note 12 at 1233-44; and Thomas R. Dye, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS 
(1990). 
 
135 Tiebout, id. at 422 (“Just as the consumer may be visualized as walking to a private market to buy his 
goods, the prices of which are set, we place him in the position of walking to a community where prices 
(taxes) of community services are set”). 
 
136Id. at 424. 
 
137 See, e.g., Volden, supra note 37 at 78-86. 
 
138 The term “experimental laboratories” was coined by Justice Brandies  in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandies, J., dissenting).  The concept of additional policy innovation created by 
jurisdictional competition has been subject to criticism in recent years. First, it has been argued that the 
desire of politicians to be reelected will curve down their incentives to adopt innovative yet risky policies. 
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980). Second, assuming local politicians do adopt innovative policies it is still not clear 
that such policies are applicable to other jurisdictions. See Volden, id. at 81-6. Nevertheless, it would still 
seem reasonable to assume that more jurisdictional diversity leads to more policy innovation. See Shapiro, 
supra  note 31 at 85-6. 
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On the other side of the debate lie commentators who point out the potential 
adverse effects of jurisdictional competition. 139 They argue that in many instances 
jurisdictions face a collective action problem that can be modeled as a non-cooperative 
game such as the prisoners’ dilemma.140 These situations are characterized by a payoff 
structure in which, despite the fact that the aggregate welfare can be optimized by 
adopting “cooperative” policies, each player has an incentive to “defect” in order to 
maximize his personal payoff. Since all of the players ant icipate the defection of the other 
players, they eventually reach an equilibrium in which they all choose to defect. In other 
words, the competitive process between jurisdictions can be characterized as an 
inefficient “race to the bottom”. Thus, just as is the case in other instances of collective 
action problems, some form of external regulation might be desirable in the jurisdictional 
market in order to reach an efficient outcome.  
Evaluating the race jurisdictions are engaged in with respect to criminal justice, 
one can point out both a potential race to the top and a potential race to the bottom. On 
one hand, competition in the area of criminal justice may have a positive effect on the 
way jurisdictions use the resources they dedicate to combating crime. In the area of 
enforcement, incentives created by crime displacement may drive local jurisdictions to 
adopt more cost effective measures to fight crime. Local law enforcement officials that 
do not deter crime effectively and draw criminals to their jurisdiction will be driven out 
of office over time and more successful individuals will take their place. In addition, 
                                                 
 
139 See, e.g., Jenna Bednar and William N. Eskridge, Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A Theory of 
Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL L. REV. 1447 (1995); Scott R. Saleska and Kristen H. 
Engel, “Facts are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate Over the 
Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting , 8 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998).  
 
140 Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 906-
07 (1987); Bednar & Eskridge, id. at 1470-75; Saleska & Engel, id. at 74-6. 
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jurisdictions wishing to gain a competitive edge will be driven to innovate and create new 
law enforcement techniques. For instance, in the area of auto theft prevention, 
jurisdictions began to encourage car owners to etch VIN numbers on the windows of their 
vehicles, making it much more difficult to resell the stolen car.141 While this type of 
precaution might be efficient in the sense that it cheaply  lowers the expected value of 
crime, it is also an observable measure that might divert criminals to cars that are not 
etched. Thus, the prospect of displaced crime might have contributed to the development 
of an efficient means to prevent auto theft. 
In the area of sanctioning, competition might drive jurisdictions to innovate with 
respect to how they sanction criminals. Over time one can expect that competitive forces 
will drive communities to converge to the most cost effective form of sanctioning. For 
example, several jurisdictions have recently shifted towards using alternative sanctions 
such as public shaming.142 Arguably, alternative sanctions are a relatively cheap way to 
generate large sanctions and to deter criminals.143 Thus, jurisdictions using these forms of 
punishment might develop a competitive advantage over jurisdictions not using them, and 
displace crime to those jurisdictions. This, in turn, will drive those jurisdictions to adopt 
more cost effective ways to punish criminals. In the area of prostitution it has been 
                                                 
 
141 Michigan 2003 Report, supra  note 61 at 6; Arizona 2003 Report, supra  note 75 at 16. 
 
142 See generally Dan Kahan , What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Dan 
Kahan & Eric Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminal: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 365 (1999). 
 
143 See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, id. at 367-8 (arguing that “shaming could prove to be an efficient alternative 
to prison for white-collar offenders”); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 733, 738 (1998) (noting that “at a time when the costs of imprisonment consume ever larger shares 
of state budgets, shame may serve as a politically viable and cost effective way of achieving deterrence, 
specific and general, as well as of satisfying the legitimate demands of retribution”). 
37
Teichman:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
THE MARKET FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE  37 
reported that jurisdictions publicizing the names of the patrons of prostitutes have 
managed to displace the activity to neighboring jurisdictions.144  
Thus far, I have focused on the advantages associated with jurisdictional 
competition in the area of criminal justice, but, such competition might have significant 
problems as well. Economists have argued for many years that the attempts of private 
actors to displace crime lead to inefficiently high investment in crime prevention. 145 For 
instance, it has recently been argued that the trend of building gated communities in some 
parts of the country reflects an inefficient equilibrium in which too many resources are 
put into gating.146 This insight also applies to the design and operation of local criminal 
justice systems. Criminal law is a type of “fence” a community builds around itself that 
raises the cost of committing crimes. Hence, jurisdictions ignoring the negative 
externalities created by the policies they adopt will be driven, ove r time, to adopt an 
increasingly harsh criminal justice system despite the fact that they would be better off 
agreeing collectively on a more lenient system.  
The argument presented here can perhaps be best understood by analyzing the 
decision jurisdictions make as to the amount of monetary resources they invest in crime 
prevention. Generally, additional resources dedicated to this cause are expected to raise 
                                                 
 
144 See Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and 
Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes’ Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1546-7 
(1996) (noting that the shaming of patrons might simply lead them to relocate to non-shaming areas).  
 
145 See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 46 at 130 (arguing that victims might take excessive observable 
precautions); Omri Ben-Shahar and Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private 
Precautions against Crime , 11 J. L. ECON & ORG. 434, 435 (1995) (arguing that individuals will choose 
levels of private enforcement that diverge from the social optimum); Omri Ben-Shahar and Alon Harel, The 
Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts: A Victim Centred Perspective, 145 PA. L. REV. 299, 309-10 
(1996) (arguing that investments in crime diversion are socially wasteful). 
 
146 Robert W. Helsley and William C. Strange, Gated Communities and the Economic Geography of Crime, 
46 J. URBAN ECON. 80, 94 (1999). 
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the probability of detection, raise the expected sanction, and lower the crime rate by 
either displacing or deterring crime. Thus, when one jurisdiction raises its expenditure on 
crime prevention, its neighboring jurisdictions are compelled to raise their expenditure as 
well in order to prevent crime displacement.147 Over time this process will drive both 
jurisdictions to invest an inefficiently high amount of resources in crime prevention. 148 
This conclusion can be applied in a straightforward fashion to the decision jurisdictions 
make as to the size of the legal sanctions they impose on criminals. Generally, imposing 
harsh criminal sanctions reflects an additional expenditure for the local criminal justice 
system. 149 Communities unable to commit to an agreed sanctioning level will be driven to 
adopt increasingly high sanctions due to the prospect of crime displacement.  
To be sure, investing additional resources in raising the probability of detection 
and incarcerating criminals will also generate positive externalities.150 Apprehending and 
prosecuting a criminal who commits crimes in several jurisdictions lowers the crime rate 
in all of those jurisdictions if he is deterred from committing future crimes. Similarly, 
incapacitating a criminal through incarceration lowers the crime rate in all of those 
jurisdictions that were victimized by the criminal at hand. Viewed from this perspective, 
jurisdictions might have insufficient incentives to invest in crime prevention since they 
will try to free ride on the efforts of neighboring jurisdictions. A complete evaluation of 
                                                 
 
147 Hakim et al., supra  note 17 at 201-206; Uriel Spiegel, Economic Theoretical View of Criminal Spillover, 
in CRIME DISPLACEMENT 48, 49-53 (Simon Hakim and George F. Rengert eds., 1981). 
 
148 Speigel, id. at 53 (noting that this process will lead communities that is not optimal). 
 
149 In some unique cases raising sanctions might actually lower the cost of administering the justice system. 
If, for instance, the threat of large sanctions assists investigators to persuade criminals to cooperate and 
testify against fellow criminals this could lower the costs of investigations. For the duration of the Article I 
will focus on the more intuitive case in which harsher sanctions reflect higher costs. 
 
150 See Richard A. Posner ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 667 (6th ed., 2003) (pointing out that states will 
have suboptimal incentives to deal with criminals who operate in several states). 
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the efficiency of jurisdictional competition in the context of criminal justice will have to 
take these positive externalities into account.  
In more general terms, the analysis presented here can be applied to all aspects of 
the criminal justice system that affect the expected sanctions potential offenders face. 
Jurisdictions adopting evidentiary rules that exclude evidence that could be useful to the 
prosecution, or procedural rules that create a significant burden on the police, will 
become more attractive crime targets and criminals will choose to shift their activity to 
them. In these contexts, the cost of imposing harsher criminal standards need not be 
encompassed in monetary terms and can be seen as the disutility caused by adopting legal 
rules that conflict with the moral values of a community, such as privacy. Hence, we can 
expect to see jurisdictions converging over time toward limiting defendants’ rights 
despite the fact that at least some of these jurisdictions would prefer to grant defendants 
additional rights that would better reflect their moral values. 
The use of legal means such as banishment to remove individuals with a high 
propensity to commit future crimes poses a more complex policy question. On one hand, 
such policies create negative externalities to neighboring jurisdictions, and thus states 
might use this type of punishment excessively. On the other hand, such forms of 
punishment might be a cost effective way to punish criminals. If that is the case, states 
might be willing to agree to a multilateral banishing regime that will allow them to 
reduce the amount of resources they spend on incarceration. Such a regime could be 
based, for example, on a tax paid by states to a common fund for each criminal they 
banish. If this tax equals the size of the negative externality associated with banishment, 
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it will function as a Pigouvian tax and assure that banishment punishments will be used 
efficiently.151  
Analyzing policies that attempt to drive convicted offenders away by creating a 
hostile environment, such as the use of SORNLs in the context of sex offenders, again 
yields inconclusive results. On one hand, states might find themselves in an escalating 
arms race to create relatively harsher policies in order to drive offenders away, just as 
was the case in the context of criminal sanctions. For instance, while public notification 
conducted door-to-door by police officers might not be an efficient way to conduct 
notification, states might find it to be an effective (yet costly) way to drive offenders out 
of the state. At the same time, other states that find some aspects of SORNLs to be 
problematic because they conflict with other values they cherish, such as forgiveness and 
compassion, might find it difficult to protect those values without attracting sex offenders 
into their community. On the other hand, jurisdictional competition with respect to 
SORNLs might be driving states to develop more efficient registration and notification 
programs. For example, the use of the Internet to disseminate information about sex 
offenders clearly has some efficiency advantages as a mode of transferring updated 
information cheaply to large populations. A final determination of the type of race states 
are engaged in with respect to SORNLs requires additional examination, but at the very 
least there is a potential for a race to the bottom in this area. 
Finally, it should be noted that several constraints limit the race to the bottom 
jurisdictions might be engaged in. First, since raising the expected sanction creates 
                                                 
 
151 The term Pigouvian taxes follows from A. C. Pigou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932). For a recent 
review see Anreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 354-56 
(1995). 
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additional costs, such as the cost of additional policemen and the cost of incarceration, 
these costs will create a constraint on the decision jurisdictions make. At some point, 
communities will find the tradeoff between the investment in crime displacement and the 
investment in other social goals to tilt the balance towards other causes. Second, 
deterrence is not the only goal that affects the design of criminal law. Values such as 
retribution and fairness obviously play a significant role in shaping criminal sanctions. 
Eventually, these values will conflict with the incentives created by crime displacement 
and stop the process described herein. Thus, while cutting off the hands of all individuals 
convicted of stealing a candy bar might be an effective way to displace crime, the moral 
values of communities could prevent them from adopting such a policy. 
 In sum, it is difficult to give a conclusive answer to the question of whether 
jurisdictions are engaged in a race to the top or a race to the bottom in the criminal justice 
context, since such a determination requires additional information regarding the concrete 
policies at hand. Nevertheless, there are at least some cases that arguably reflect 
inefficient races to the bottom, in which social welfare could be enhanced by assisting 
jurisdictions to co-operate. In the next subsection, I will turn to evaluate potential ways to 
deal with those situations. 
 
2. Resolving the Race to the Bottom Problem 
i. Local Solutions 
A good place to begin analyzing the potential solutions to the race to the bottom 
problem is the local jurisdictions themselves. After all, if jurisdictions are situated in a 
non-cooperative inefficient deadlock, they have the most to gain from resolving the 
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problem and reaching a cooperative outcome. Jurisdictions have two ways to overcome 
problems associated with inefficient competition, namely, informal and formal 
cooperation. I will begin by evaluating the former. 
The race to the bottom hypothesis is based on the claim that when jurisdictions set 
policies in the context of criminal justice they are situated within a non-cooperative game 
such as the prisoners’ dilemma and therefore cannot cooperate. Yet this result rests on a 
set of assumptions that define these games. More precisely, the setting of a prisoners’ 
dilemma includes three explicit assumptions that make cooperation difficult. First, it 
assumes that the players are one-shot players. Second, it assumes that the players make a 
single simultaneous unobservable decision rather than multiple staggered observable 
decisions. Finally, it assumes that the players cannot communicate among themselves 
prior to making their choices. Yet one should notice that these assumptions do not 
adequately describe the situation of local jurisdictions. Jurisdictions are entities with an 
infinite life span that interact with each other on a regular basis.152 These interactions 
allow for constant communications that enable the evolution of a cooperative 
relationship. Furthermore, legislation and public policies are transparent in nature and 
therefore jurisdictions can observe each others’ acts. Given these characteristics, one can 
expect that some form of voluntary cooperation might emerge between jurisdictions in 
order to avoid the inefficient results associated with non-cooperative behavior. Just as 
                                                 
 
152 To be sure, despite the fact that jurisdictions have an infinite life span, individual policymakers, namely 
elected politicians, do not. As such politicians approach the end of their political life they might adopt end 
game strategies and behave in a non-cooperative manner. The end game problem has been well 
documented in the norms literature, see, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 267-8 (1991) 
(analyzing the demise of cooperation among the Ik in an end game situation). On the other hand, one 
should note that bureaucrats with long term tenure tend to have a significant influence on public policies. 
Thus, jurisdictions might actually be some kind of intermediate entity, which can sustain long-term 
cooperation subject to short-term opportunism by politicians. 
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norms may serve as an alternative to formal law in solving collective action problems 
among individuals and small groups, local jurisdictions may develop means of 
cooperation without resorting to formal regulation. 153 In fact, some commentators have 
been pointing out that despite potential incentives to defect, jurisdictions are in many 
cases behaving in a cooperative manner.154 In the context of law enforcement, one can 
find an abundance of examples of local police departments assisting each other in a 
cooperative fashion rather than engaging in opportunistic defections.155 This type of 
behavior is consistent with a general norm of cooperation among jurisdictions. 
A second way local jurisdictions can deal with the race to the bottom problem on 
their own is by formal legal means. Jurisdictions may enter into formal agreements in 
which they will commit themselves to behave in a cooperative manner. Currently, nearly 
200 compacts regulate different aspects of state relationships ranging from environmental 
policies to taxation. 156 Voluntary compacts can be a useful means to solve some of the 
collective action problems jurisdictions face in the area of criminal justice as well. For 
example, the field of parolee and probationer supervision closely resembles the field of 
                                                 
 
153 See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 73-87 (1984) (describing the emergence of 
cooperative norms between enemy soldiers in World War I that were situated in a repeated game); 
Ellickson, id. (describing the emergence of cooperative norms in Shasta County that functioned as an 
alternative to formal law). 
 
154 Peterson, Rabe and Wong, supra  note 31 at 6 (noting that states tend to cooperate among themselves in 
many of the cases). 
 
155 See, e.g., Julie Bykowicz, New Lines of Jurisdiction Trend: Police Departments are Increasingly 
Pooling Resources to Fight Crime More Efficiently, THE BALTIMORE SUN, August 13, 2000 at 1B 
(describing cooperation among local police departments in Maryland);  James Vaznis, City Guard Against 
Gang Culture’s Spread ‘Tha Fam’ Faces Drug Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 23, 2003 at 4 (reporting on 
cooperation between New Hampshire and Massachusetts police departments with respect to gang activity); 
Mary Jean, Car-Theft Program Could End, THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 8, 1992 at C3 (reporting on a 
visit of Florida officials in Michigan to learn about the Michigan ATPA). 
 
156 See The Council for State Government Website available at 
http://www.csg.org/CSG/Programs/interstate+compacts/compact+laws.htm (last visited May 5, 2004).  
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sex offenders analyzed above since it also deals with individuals that states are happy to 
drive away. In order to overcome the problem, states voluntarily entered into a compact 
that regulates their behavior in this area.157 The compact created a commission that 
enacted rules to govern the transfer of offenders from one jurisdiction to the other.158 
Similarly, the states are moving toward adopting a compact regulating the area of 
juvenile offenders.159 
 
ii. Central Planners 
The force driving the inefficiencies associated with crime displacement lies in the 
ability of jurisdictions to externalize a negative phenomenon to neighboring jurisdictions. 
Generally, a common solution to externality problems is the use of a central authority that 
takes into account all of the externalities and aims to maximize the aggregate welfare of 
society. For instance, in the context of state policies that create negative externalities, 
federal intervention is a possible solution. 160 Similarly, counties and cities creating 
negative externalities could be regulated by states. 
                                                 
 
157 Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Adult Offenders available at 
http://www.adultcompact.org/about/history/historical/Compact_Preamble.pdf (last visited May 5th 2004). 
The field of parolee and probationer supervision use to be governed by the Interstate Compact for the 
Supervision of Parolees and Probationers since 1973. Recently, that compact was substituted by the 
Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. For updated information on the new compact see 
http://www.adultcompact.org/About.htm. For a review of the compact see James J. Gentry, The Interstate 
Compact for Adult Offender Supervision: Parolee and Probationer Supervision Enters the Twenty-First 
Century, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2001). 
 
158 Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision, Rules (amended March 12, 2004) available at 
http://www.adultcompact.org/about/history/h_docs.shtml (last visited May 5, 2004). 
 
159 The Interstates Compact for Juveniles, available at 
http://www.csg.org/CSG/Policy/public+safety+and+justice/interstate+compact+for+juveniles/default.htm 
(last visited May 5th, 2004). The Compact requires that 35 states adopt it before it becomes binding (see  
Compact Article X). As of the beginning of 2004 12 states have enacted laws adopting the compact. 
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In recent years we have seen a substantial increase in federal involvement in the 
area of criminal justice. This increase can be seen in the enlargement of the scope of 
federal criminal law, in the added criminal litigation in the federal court system, and in 
the rise of the relative size of the federal expenditure on criminal justice.161 Generally, 
this trend has been widely criticized by legal scholars.162 While some of the current 
trends in federal criminal legislation have little to do with preventing inefficient 
jurisdictional competition, this Article does point toward the conclusion that the federal 
government could have an important role as a regulator of the states in the area of 
criminal justice. According to this line of thought, the federal government should help 
states achieve uniformity in their expected sanctions with respect to crimes that tend to be 
displaced.163 One way the federal government could achieve this goal is by creating a 
uniform federal criminal code for such crimes that states would be encouraged to adopt. 
To the extent that states would be reluctant to adopt such a uniform code, the federal 
government might need to ensure that such a code preempts state criminal legislation 
with respect to the crimes that it covers.164  
                                                                                                                                                 
160 McKinnon & Nechyba, supra  note 42 at 8-9 (discussing mobility externalities among states). Shapiro, 
supra  note 31 at 44-5 (a strong national authority is needed in the presence of externalities). 
 
161 Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm than Good: Assessing the Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 
MINN. L. REV. 455, 461-65 (1994) (describing the recent “explosion” in federal criminal legislation); Beale, 
supra  note 23 at 983-96 (evaluating the burden on the federal judiciary); Justice Expenditure Report, supra  
note 1 at 3 (reporting an increase in the relative size of the federal expenditure on the justice system 
between 1982 and 2001). 
 
162 See supra note 26. This criticism goes hand in hand with a more general view that is prevalent in the 
federalism literature according to which the federal government has overstepped its bounds in recent years. 
See Ferejohn & Weingast, supra  note 31 at x (arguing that in some areas powers should be given back to 
the states). 
 
163 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2421 (1997) (noting that 
uniform criminal penalties can minimize the geographic displacement of crime). 
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In the area of enforcement, the federal government should focus its attention on 
curving down the incentives for states to spend inefficiently high amounts of resources on 
fighting crime. This goal could be achieved by mandating maximum law enforcement 
expenditures with respect to specific types of crimes. Such mandates could allow for an 
efficient planning of the amount of resources spent, while sustaining the advantages of 
jurisdictional competition with respect to how to use the resources. If such a scheme 
proves too difficult to manage, one will have to consider organizational consolidation, 
which would mean moving law enforcement activity to the hands of a central planner 
such as the FBI.165 A concrete example of organizational consolidation dealing with 
problems of crime displacement is the state ATPAs discussed above.166 While on the 
interstate level, the rise of ATPAs can be seen as part of the arms race different states are 
engaged in with respect to auto theft, on the intrastate level the creation of these 
authorities can be viewed as a way to curve down competition between neighboring 
localities within a given state that attempt to displace auto theft from one to the other. 
ATPAs are state authorities that aim to curve down auto theft in the state as whole and 
not in any specific county. 167 Thus, these authorities can act as central planners and take 
                                                                                                                                                 
164 Generally current federal criminal legislation creates a concurrent criminal jurisdiction and does not 
preempt state criminal laws. See Susan Klein, Independent – Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. 
L. REV. 1451, 1552 (2002). 
 
165 See Mehay, supra note 48 at 67-8 (arguing out that crime  displacement justifies consolidating local 
police departments). 
 
166 See supra  notes 60-84 and accompanying text. 
 
167 See, e.g., Vernon’s Ann. Texas. Civ. St. Art. 4413(37) Sec 7. (b)(1) (Texas authority required to create a 
plan of operation to deal with auto theft in “areas where the problems are greatest”); Act 4005 Illinois 
Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Act §2 (Illinois authority is established for the purpose of “statewide 
planning”). This view was also incorporated by many ATPAs into their official policy statements. See, e.g., 
New York 2002 Annual Report at iv (mission statement states that the ATPA “shall provide for a 
coordinated approach to curtailing motor vehicle theft and motor vehicle insurance fraud throughout the 
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into account the potential displacement effect of local initiatives. For instance, the 
Pennsylvania ATPA reportedly monitored and dealt with the displacement effects caused 
by its concentrated efforts in Philadelphia.168 
Finally, a more general insight arising out of this Article is that the federal courts 
have an important role in the creation of pro-defendant rights and regulation of police 
behavior. Policies regarding search and seizure, interrogation methods, right to legal 
counsel, and the rules of evidence all affect the eventual probability of being sanctioned. 
Thus, jurisdictions may try to displace crime from one to the other by limiting 
defendants’ rights in these contexts even if they would be willing to commit to a 
collective decision to protect these rights. In order to deal with this potential problem, 
federal courts have a responsibility to identify those rights that reflect a long term 
national consensus and protect them in the face of local jurisdictions attempting to 
displace crime. Thus, this Article presents an economic justification for the incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. Opponents of incorporation 
repeatedly refer to concepts of federalism, and the fact that allowing for diversity in the 
area of crime control would allow rules to fit the specific needs of local communities and 
encourage additional experimentation with new policies.169 While this view raises a valid 
issue, it overlooks other aspects of federalism. For one, federalism deals with solving 
                                                                                                                                                 
State”); Arizona 2003 Report, supra  note 75 at 2 (mission statement “To deter vehicle theft through a 
statewide cooperative effort”). 
 
168 Martin Pflieger, Auto Thefts Targets of Crackdowns in PA., ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Oct. 15, 1996 
at A1 (comments made by Roy Miller, executive director of the local ATPA). See also  Jeanette Krebs, Auto 
Thefts in State Stall, PATRIOT NEWS, Dec. 1, 1999 at B1 (comment made by Kenneth Robinson of the local 
ATPA). 
 
169 Justice Harlan has voiced a constant view to that effect. See, e.g ., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680-1 
(1961); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16-7 (1964) (Harlan dissenting); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 
(1965) (Harlan concurring); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 117, 138 (1970) (Harlan dissenting and 
concurring). 
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collective action problems within the federation, and as we have seen, states and other 
localities might face such a problem when designing their criminal justice system. 
In addition, the analysis presented in this Article points out why, as a positive 
matter, we should be skeptical towards the viability of the “new federalism” in the area of 
criminal procedure. The term new federalism, coined by Donald Wilkes in the mid 70s, 
refers to a line of rulings of state Supreme Courts that used state constitutions in order to 
grant local criminal defendants rights that were beyond those required by the federal 
constitution. 170 As we have seen, jurisdictions that impose additional constraints on their 
law enforcement agencies are expected to find themselves in a competitive disadvantage 
when compared to other jurisdictions. This, in turn, will cause a rise in the crime rate, 
which will generate popular demand for adopting stricter policies with respect to crime 
control. Thus, it is not surprising to see that only a decade after the publication of his 
paper, Wilkes voiced serious concern as to the development of the new federalism. 171 
Two well publicized indications of the dynamics described here occurred in Florida and 
California, where constraints imposed by the local Supreme Courts on law enforcement 
were overruled by constitutional amendments that prohibited state courts from granting 
criminal defendants rights exceeding their minimal federal rights.172 These two examples 
                                                 
170 Donald E. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger 
Court, 62 KY. L. J. 421 (1974). 
171 Donald E. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure in 1984: Death of a Phoenix?, in 
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 166 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985) 
 
172 See FLA. CONST . art. I, § 12 (1983); CAL. CONST . art. I § 28(d). For a review of these amendments see 
Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida’s “Forced Linkage” 
Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 653 (1987); Rachel A. Van Cleave, A Constitution in Conflict: The 
Doctrine of Independdent State Grounds and the Voter Initiative in California, 21 HASTINGS CONST . L. Q. 
95 (1993). 
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seem to reflect a general trend, and currently, only a distinct minority of states grants 
defendants rights that exceed their federal rights.173 
The federal courts can play a similar role with respect to regulating criminal 
sanctions by using their authority under the Eighth Amendment to strike down cruel and 
unusual punishments.174 In Solem v. Helm,175 the Court evaluated a life sentence without 
the possibility of parole imposed on a repeat offender convicted of issuing a no account 
check for $100.176 Striking down the punishment, the Solem Court held that the 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments included a proportionality requirement 
between the crime and the punishment.177 As part of this evaluation, the Court compared 
the punishment at hand with sentences imposed for the commission of similar crimes in 
other jurisdictions.178 The Solem proportionality analysis is consistent with the role of 
federal regulators presented in this Article. States adopting criminal sanctions that are 
beyond the accepted sanctioning level in other states create a negative externality in the 
form of crime displacement, and the federal governmental should assist the states to solve 
this collective action problem. Regretfully, in recent years the Solem holding has slowly 
eroded and one should question the viability of current challenges to extreme 
incarceration sanctions.179 
                                                 
 
173 Kamisar et. al., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  52 (10th ed., 2002) 
 
174 The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bails shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted”. See U.S. CONST . Amend. VIII. 
 
175 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 
176 Id. at 281-82. 
 
177 Id at 286-88. 
 
178 Id. at 291-92. 
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Viewing the federal legislation dealing with the specific areas analyzed in this 
Article demonstrates that current federal criminal policies do not reflect a proper 
understanding of the federal government’s role as a central planner with respect to 
criminal justice. In the area of auto theft, for example, following the rise in auto theft in 
general, and the emergence of a new and violent form of the crime ,carjacking, the 
federal legislature enacted the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 (ACTA).180 The ACTA 
includes several provisions that can be seen as positive steps made by a central planner in 
order to coordinate the activity of the states. For instance, encouraging states to 
participate in the creation of a national motor vehicle title registration system reflects an 
effort to promote projects creating positive externalities.181 Yet the ACTA adopts a more 
problematic approach as to the role of the federal government with respect to the 
regulation of the resources spent on fighting auto theft. More precisely, the ACTA 
conditions state eligibility for federal grants on the creation of a state ATPA much like 
Michigan’s.182 As we have seen, however, the prospect of crime displacement gives 
states sufficient incentives to create such entities, and it is not clear why the federal 
government is encouraging the adoption of local policies that create negative 
externalities. In this situation, a central planner should curve down the excessive 
                                                                                                                                                 
179 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding a life sentence without the possibility 
of parole for a first time offender convicted of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine); Ewing v. 
California 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding a California 25 years to life sentence for stealing merchandise 
valued at approximately $1,200); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding a California sentence 
for two consecutive sentences of 25 to life for two cases of petty theft). Interestingly, in Ewing Justice 
O’Connor took notice of the displacement effect created by the California three-strike law in question yet 
seems to have viewed this result as a legitimate state interest that justifies the law. Ewing, id. at 27. This 
type of analysis is inconsistent with a central planner attempting to deal with negative externalities created 
by members of a federal system of government. 
 
180 Codified in various sections of Section 15, 18 and 42 of the U.S. code. 
 
181 15 U.S.C. §2042-3. 
 
182 42 U.S.C. §3750b. 
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motivation states have in displacing auto theft by, for example, conditioning federal 
grants on a certain cap on the surcharge states can impose in order to fund their ATPAs. 
Turning to the area of ex-post displacement of criminals, the Jacob Wetterling Act 
again reflects a misunderstanding of the role of the federal government in designing 
crime prevention policies, since it is structured under the premise that states have 
insufficient incentives to enact effective SORNLs and therefore includes minimal 
requirements that states must live up to.183 Given the evidence presented here, there is no 
reason to assume that states will have insufficient incentives to enact notification laws 
that primarily serve the interests of local communities.184 To the contrary, states have an 
incentive to adopt strict notification provisions in order to generate sex offender 
migration. Thus, the appropriate federal policy in this context, much like in other NIMBY 
type situations, is to adopt a unified federal framework that has maximum standards.185 
This framework should determine issues such as who will be subjected to notification, 
notification methods, and the duration of notification. This framework could allow for 
                                                 
 
183 Megan’s Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64 FED. REG. 572, 572 (1999) (noting that “[t]he Wettlerling Act 
generally sets out minimum standards for state sex offender registration programs”). 
 
184 This might not be the case with respect to registration requirements. With respect to registration one 
might assume that there are positive externalities for the efforts of each individual state in the form of a 
comprehensive data set that can serve all states. This is especially true given the creation of a federal sex 
offender database. See 42 U.S.C. §14072 (establishing a federal sex offender database). Hence, imposing 
minimal federal requirements in that context might be a sensible policy.  
 
185 See Revesz, supra  note 12 at 1219 note 24 (noting that “the solution to NIMBY problems is federal 
maximum standards (federal ceilings), which would pre-empt more stringent but not less stringent state 
standards”). At least one commentator has suggested the adoption of a unified federal scheme dealing with 
sex offender registration and notification. See Julia A. Houston, Note, Sex Offender Registration Acts: An 
Added Dimension to the War on Crime, 28 GA . L. REV. 729, 764-5 (1994). Houston rests her argument on 
what can be termed as economies of scale of a federal system rather than on the problems associated with 
state competition analyzed in the text above. 
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some forms of local policy innovations that diverge from it, yet these innovations should 
be scrutinized to assure that they are not opportunistic.  
A specific aspect of SORNLs that might generate future litigation is registration 
requirements that target sex offenders who migrate from states that require them to 
register to states that do not. As noted above, several states require such offenders to 
register as sex offenders despite the fact that current residents of the state that committed 
identical crimes are not required to do so.186 From a constitutional perspective, these 
limitations are problematic since they might be seen by courts as a violation of offenders’ 
right to travel freely from one state to another. The Supreme Court has recognized such a 
constitutional right in a long line of cases.187 Recently, in Saenz v. Roe, the Court 
evaluated the implications of this right to state policies that create a differential treatment 
to new residents of states. The specific issue at hand was a California statute limiting the 
welfare benefits of new California residents during their first year of residence in 
California to the level of welfare that they were entitled to in their original state of 
residence.188 Basing its decision on the Privileges or Immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court ruled that all citizens of the United States have a right to choose 
their state of residence and each state is obliged to treat them equally.189 Furthermore, the 
Seanz Court found this to be a strict requirement and refused to adopt any intermediate 
                                                 
 
186 See supra  notes 129-130 and accompanying text. 
 
187 See, e.g., United States v. Guests 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618, 89 
(1969); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) 
 
188 Saenz, id. at 492-6.  
 
189 Id. at 504-5 
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standard of review to apply to policies that discriminate against new residents.190 Thus, 
the Court found the adoption of discriminatory policies to prevent migration of welfare 
applicants to be impermissible.191 In addition, the Court rejected California’s claim that 
the budget savings created by the policy justified its application. 192 Accordingly, the 
Court struck down the California statue and ruled that it must provide all of its residents 
equal welfare benefits.193  
In light of the hostile attitude of the Seanz Court towards policies aimed at 
discouraging migration, there seems to be a distinct possibility that registration 
requirements based on previous residence will similarly be found unconstitutional. Once 
states do not require their own residents who committed identical crimes to register, it is 
difficult to see how they will be able to justify the differential treatment granted to new 
residents. Arguably these new residents pose no greater risk to the public than equivalent 
local residents. Nonetheless, states wishing to defend such policies might be able to 
distinguish the Seanz ruling in two ways. First, Seanz relies on the Privileges or 
Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which lends itself quite naturally to an 
issue such as welfare benefits. It is not clear whether the Court will be willing to 
recognize a constitutional “privilege” not to be included in a sex offender registry. 
Second, the Seanz Court noted that the relatively generous welfare benefits granted by 
California did not create any significant migration of welfare recipients to the state.194 
                                                 
 
190 Id. 
 
191 Id. at 506. 
 
192 Id. at 506-7. 
 
193 Id. at 507. 
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Thus, one could argue that strong empirical evidence supporting the sex offender 
migration hypothesis might cause the Court to reconsider its ruling.  
From the perspective of jurisdictional competition, residence based registration 
requirements are a sensible means to prevent a race to the bottom in the area of SORNLs. 
Once a state adopts such a provision, it in effect removes itself from the jurisdictional 
race and is free to adopt any registration policy that best reflects its values with no need 
to “keep up” with harsh conditions adopted by other states. Thus, while such programs 
might seem detrimental to sex offenders (and quite naturally that would seem to be the 
case when a specific sex offender brings a lawsuit challenging such a policy) they might 
actually be in the best interest of sex offenders as a group.  
A piece of federal legislation that attempts to deal with the problem of offenders 
displacement is Aimee’s Law, 195 named after Aimee Willard who was kidnapped, raped, 
and murdered near Philadelphia by a Nevada parolee. Aimee’s Law provides that a state 
that convicts an offender of murder, rape, or a dangerous sexual offense, who has a prior 
conviction for any one of those offenses, is entitled to a reimbursement of the costs of the 
incarceration, prosecution, and apprehension of that individual from the state that 
previously convicted and released him.196 In addition, the law creates a safe harbor for 
states that impose an average term of imprisonment for the relevant offence that is higher 
than the national average imprisonment for that crime and that kept the individual at hand 
incarcerated for at least 85 percent of his prison term. 197 Aimee’s Law represents a 
                                                                                                                                                 
194 Id. at 506. 
 
195 Codified as 42 U.S.C. § 13713. 
 
196 42 U.S.C. § 13713(c). More precisely this reimbursement is achieved by a deduction of federal law 
enforcement grants that is transferred from state to state. 
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positive step toward causing states to internalize the effects of their policies since it 
imposes on states at least some of the costs of the crime they displace to neighboring 
states. On the other hand, it should be noted that the safe harbor created by the law 
creates yet another “race” for states in the context of criminal sanctioning, since by 
adopting and imposing sanctions that are above the national average, states are able to 
reduce their liability under Aimee’s Law to zero. While this incentive structure might 
achieve the actual goal of the proponents of Aimee’s Law, namely, the incarceration of 
offenders convicted of one of the crimes the law deals with for life,198 this outcome is not 
necessarily efficient.  
*** 
 In sum, this Section has evaluated the normative aspects of jurisdictional 
competition in the area of criminal justice. The tentative conclusion of this discussion 
was that additional federal regulation in the area of criminal justice might be desirable if 
there exists a race to the bottom problem. Nevertheless, a caveat should be added. As we 
have seen, current federal legislation in the area of crime control does not reflect a proper 
understanding of the role of the federal government as a central planner. Rather, it 
reflects a “tough on crime” attitude no matter what the context of the legislation. If 
federal law makers - for whatever institutional, political, or personal reasons - cannot 
assume the role of a rational central planner, the United States’ criminal justice system 
has little to gain, and perhaps even much to lose, from additional federal regulation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
197 42 U.S.C. § 13713(c)(3). 
 
198 Statement of Representative Matt Salmon, May 11, 2000, Cong. Testimony 2000 WL 19303527. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has aimed to point out the unique dynamics that might be created by 
a decentralized criminal justice system such as the one in the United States. Using tools 
of positive public choice theory, I have demonstrated that in a decentralized criminal 
justice system local units have an incentive to lower their crime rate by displacing crime 
to neighbouring jurisdictions. More specifically, I have identified two ways jurisdictions 
can achieve this goal. The first focuses on ex-ante deterrence and aims to raise the 
expected sanction in any given jurisdiction to a level that is higher than that of its 
neighbouring jurisdictions. The second focuses on the ex-post displacement of 
individuals who have demonstrated by past behavior that they have a high propensity to 
commit crimes. This analysis led to a normative discussion according to which the United 
States might be engaged in a race to the bottom in the context of its criminal justice 
system. To the extent that this type of race is in fact taking place, this could have 
significant implications as to the role of the federal and state governments as regulators in 
the area of criminal justice. 
Describing the criminal justice system as a product of market place interactions 
between jurisdictions might run against the intuitions of many who view the criminal 
justice system as a tool that both should, and actually does, focus on the infliction of just 
retribution. Yet, one should notice that the argument presented in this Article has little to 
do with the normative goal of the criminal justice system. Rather, this Article focuses on 
a positive description of the criminal justice system. From this perspective, all that is 
required for the political process described in this Article to take place is that deterrence 
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and reduction of future crime rates is one of the things that matters to local politicians. 
This does not seem to be a far fetched assumption. Furthermore, actual crime 
displacement is not a precondition for the validity of the argument made here. As long as 
the public perceives that displacement is caused by raising sanctions, raising the 
probability of detection, or limiting defendants’ rights, politicians will aim to be driven to 
adopt such policies. 
The introduction of the concept of the market for criminal justice leaves room for 
substantial future analytical and empirical research. On the analytical side, this research 
should focus on specific aspects of the criminal justice system that might be prone to 
competitive effects. This research could track the political forces that drive changes in the 
wide body of criminal doctrine, the criminal process, and evidence law. On the empirical 
side, future work could focus on measuring changes over time in the criminal justice 
system, and measuring the displacement effect of criminal law. Additionally, studies 
comparing the United States with countries that have a national unified criminal justice 
system could shed light on the topics identified in this Article. Only after this information 
is collected will one be able to offer a definitive answer to the question: Is the American 
criminal justice system engaged in a race to the top or a race to the bottom? 
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